Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines movements in the prices of target stocks as predictors of the ultimate success or failure of tender offers. An empirical investigation of 100% cash tender offers during the years 1976 to 1981 leads to the conclusion that, with few exceptions, market prices are well‐calibrated, i.e., the current target price during the offer period measures the expected (discounted) stock price at the conclusion date. The market's probability predictions improve monotonically over time.

Publication of the December 1985 issue of the Journal of Finance completed the Journal's first 40 years of contributions to the profession. This study identifies and summarizes the contributing authors, where they earned their doctoral degrees, and their employers at the time of publication. The authors, degree‐granting institutions, and employers appearing most frequently in the Journal are ordered for the entire 40‐year period and for various subperiods. Where possible, the present findings are compared with those of previously published studies.

Taxation of asset returns can create various clientele effects. If every agent is marginal on all assets, no clientele effects arise. If some (but not every) agent is marginal on all assets, there arises a clientele effect in quantities but none in prices. If no agent is marginal on all assets, there arise clientele effects in both quantities and prices. In the first two cases, standard asset pricing and martingale results extend to analogous aftertax results. In the third case, linear asset pricing works only on subsets of assets, and the standard martingale results become after‐tax supermartingale results.

This paper examines the issue of integration versus segmentation of the Canadian equity market relative to a global North American market. We compare the international and domestic versions of the CAPM, and find that integration, or the mean-variance efficiency of the global market index, is rejected by the data. Segmentation is the preferred model, based on a maximum likelihood procedure correcting for thin trading. We further divide the sample into securities that are interlisted in Canada and the U.S., and those that are not. Integration is rejected for both groups, which indicates that the source of segmentation can be traced to legal barriers based on the nationality of issuing firms.

Interest rate swaps, a financial innovation in recent years, are based upon the principle of comparative advantage. An interest rate swap is a useful tool for active liability management and for hedging against interest rate risk. The purpose of this paper is to provide a simple economic analysis of interest rate swaps. Alternative uses of and the appropriate valuation procedure for interest rate swaps are described.

Several observed features of takeover contests appear to be inconsistent with value‐maximizing behavior on the part of the agents involved. For instance, managers occasionally resist takeover bids, presumably in order to facilitate competition among bidders. However, counterbids do not always materialize, suggesting that management resistance was not in the best interests of the firm's shareholders. On the other hand, a successful takeover is sometimes accompanied by a decrease in the value of the acquirer's shares. In addition, valuable combinations are occasionally not consummated. We present a simple illustration of sequential takeover bidding in which all managers act in the best interests of their respective shareholders. Within the context of this model, we provide an explanation of the type of behavior described above.

The theory of financial economics has failed to distinguish advantages of callable bonds from those of short‐term debt. This paper shows that either type of borrowing can signal a firm's better prospects but that short‐term debt does so at the cost of weakened risk‐sharing with capital markets. By issuing either equity or long‐term, non‐callable debt, a firm with poor investment opportunities will not pool its prospects with those of a better firm. But equity produces superior risk‐sharing. Perhaps this explains the almost complete absence of long‐term, non‐callable bonds from observed corporate capital structures.