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Price Reactions to Dividend Initiations and Omissions: Overreaction or Drift?

Journal of Finance 1995 50(2), 573-608
This article investigates market reactions to initiations and omissions of cash dividend payments. Consistent with prior literature we find that the magnitude of short‐run price reactions to omissions are greater than for initiations. In the year following the announcements, prices continue to drift in the same direction, though the drift following omissions is stronger and more robust. This post‐dividend initiation/omission price drift is distinct from and more pronounced than that following earnings surprises. A trading rule employing both samples earns positive returns in 22 out of 25 years. We find little evidence for clientele shifts in either sample.

Another Look at the Cross‐section of Expected Stock Returns

Journal of Finance 1995 50(1), 185-224
Our examination of the cross‐section of expected returns reveals economically and statistically significant compensation (about 6 to 9 percent per annum) for beta risk when betas are estimated from time‐series regressions of annual portfolio returns on the annual return on the equally weighted market index. The relation between book‐to‐market equity and returns is weaker and less consistent than that in Fama and French (1992). We conjecture that past book‐to‐market results using COMPUS‐TAT data are affected by a selection bias and provide indirect evidence.

Size and Book-to-Market Factors in Earnings and Returns

Journal of Finance 1995 50(1), 131
We study whether the behavior of stock prices, in relation to size and book to market equity (BE/ME), reflects the behavior of earnings. Consistent with rational pricing, high BE/ME signals persistent poor earnings and low BE/ME signals strong earnings. Moreover, stock prices forecast the reversion of earnings growth observed after firms are ranked on size and BE/ME. Finally, there are market, size, and BE/ME factors in earnings like those in returns. The market and size factors in earnings help explain those in returns, but we find no link between BE/ME factors in earnings and returns.

Predictability of Stock Returns: Robustness and Economic Significance

Journal of Finance 1995 50(4), 1201-1228
This article examines the robustness of the evidence on predictability of U.S. stock returns, and addresses the issue of whether this predictability could have been historically exploited by investors to earn profits in excess of a buy‐and‐hold strategy in the market index. We find that the predictive power of various economic factors over stock returns changes through time and tends to vary with the volatility of returns. The degree to which stock returns were predictable seemed quite low during the relatively calm markets in the 1960s, but increased to a level where, net of transaction costs, it could have been exploited by investors in the volatile markets of the 1970s.

An Empirical Analysis of the Limit Order Book and the Order Flow in the Paris Bourse

Journal of Finance 1995 50(5), 1655-1689
As a centralized, computerized, limit order market, the Paris Bourse is particularly appropriate for studying the interaction between the order book and order flow. Descriptive methods capture the richness of the data and distinctive aspects of the market structure. Order flow is concentrated near the quote, while the depth of the book is somewhat larger at nearby valuations. We analyze the supply and demand of liquidity. For example, thin books elicit orders and thick books result in trades. To gain price and time priority, investors quickly place orders within the quotes when the depth at the quotes or the spread is large. Consistent with information effects, downward (upward) shifts in both bid and ask quotes occur after large sales (purchases).

Covenants and Collateral as Incentives to Monitor

Journal of Finance 1995 50(4), 1113-1146
Although monitoring borrowers is thought to be a major function of financial institutions, the presence of other claimants reduces an institutional lender's incentives to do this. Thus loan contracts must be structured to enhance the lender's incentives to monitor. Covenants make a loan's effective maturity, and the ability to collateralize makes a loan's effective priority, contingent on monitoring by the lender. Thus both covenants and collateral can be motivated as contractual devices that increase a lender's incentive to monitor. These results are consistent with a number of stylized facts about the use of covenants and collateral in institutional lending.

Returns from Investing in Equity Mutual Funds 1971 to 1991

Journal of Finance 1995 50(2), 549-572
Several recent studies suggest that equity mutual fund managers achieve superior returns and that considerable persistence in performance exists. This study utilizes a unique data set including returns from all equity mutual funds existing each year. These data enable us more precisely to examine performance and the extent of survivorship bias. In the aggregate, funds have underperformed benchmark portfolios both after management expenses and even gross of expenses. Survivorship bias appears to be more important than other studies have estimated. Moreover, while considerable performance persistence existed during the 1970s, there was no consistency in fund returns during the 1980s.

Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms

Journal of Finance 1995 50(1), 301-318
This article examines the representation of venture capitalists on the boards of private firms in their portfolios. If venture capitalists are intensive monitors of managers, their involvement as directors should be more intense when the need for oversight is greater. I show that venture capitalists' representation on the board increases around the time of chief executive officer turnover, while the number of other outsiders remains constant. I also show that distance to the firm is an important determinant of the board membership of venture capitalists, as might be anticipated if the oversight of local firms is less costly than more distant businesses.

Explaining Forward Exchange Bias . . . Intraday.

Journal of Finance 1995 50(4), 1321-29
Intraday interest rates are zero. Consequently, a foreign exchange dealer can short a vulnerable currency in the morning, close this position in the afternoon, and never face an interest cost. This tactic might seem especially attractive in times of fixed-rate crisis, since it suggests an immunity to the central bank's interest rate defense. In equilibrium, however, buyers of the vulnerable currency must be compensated on average with an intraday capital gain as long as no devaluation occurs. That is, currencies under attack should typically appreciate intraday. Using data on intraday exchange rate changes within the European Monetary System, we find this prediction is borne out.

The World Price of Foreign Exchange Risk.

Journal of Finance 1995 50(2), 445-79
Departures from purchasing power parity imply that different countries have different prices for goods when a common numeraire is used. Stochastic changes in exchange rates are associated with changes in these prices and constitute additional sources of risk in asset pricing models. This article investigates whether exchange rate risks are priced in international asset markets using a conditional approach that allows for time variation in the rewards for exchange rate risk. The results for equities and currencies of the world's four largest equity markets support the existence of foreign exchange risk premia.