Knowledge that Transforms

Minimum price variation rules help explain why stock prices vary substantially across countries, and other curiosities of share prices. Companies tend to split their stock so that the institutionally mandated minimum tick size is optimal relative to the stock price. A large relative tick size provides an incentive for dealers to make markets and for investors to provide liquidity by placing limit orders, despite its placing a high floor on the quoted bid‐ask spread. A simple model suggests that idiosyncratic risk, firm size, and visibility of the firm affect the optimal relative tick size and thus the share price.

Using data from the 1986 oil price decrease, I examine the capital expenditures of nonoil subsidiaries of oil companies. I test the joint hypothesis that 1) a decrease in cash/collateral decreases investment, holding fixed the profitability of investment, and 2) the finance costs of different parts of the same corporation are interdependent. The results support this joint hypothesis: oil companies significantly reduced their nonoil investment compared to the median industry investment. The 1986 decline in investment was concentrated in nonoil units that were subsidized by the rest of the company in 1985.

This study provides evidence that transactions costs discourage debt reductions by financially distressed firms when they restructure their debt out of court. As a result, these firms remain highly leveraged and one‐in‐three subsequently experience financial distress. Transactions costs are significantly smaller, hence leverage falls by more and there is less recurrence of financial distress, when firms recontract in Chapter 11. Chapter 11 therefore gives financially distressed firms more flexibility to choose optimal capital structures.

This article examines whether shifts in the stance of monetary policy can account for the observed predictability in excess stock returns. Using long‐horizon regressions and short‐horizon vector autoregressions, the article concludes that monetary policy variables are significant predictors of future returns, although they cannot fully account for observed stock return predictability. I undertake variance decompositions to investigate how monetary policy affects the individual components of excess returns (risk‐free discount rates, risk premia, or cash flows).

When firms experience financial distress, equity holders may act strategically, forcing concessions from debtholders and paying less than the originally‐contracted interest payments. This article incorporates strategic debt service in a standard, continuous time asset pricing model, developing simple closed‐form expressions for debt and equity values. We find that strategic debt service can account for a substantial proportion of the premium on risky corporate debt. We analyze the efficiency implications of strategic debt service, showing that it can eliminate both direct bankruptcy costs and agency costs of debt.

This article presents a technique for nonparametrically estimating continuous‐time diffusion processes that are observed at discrete intervals. We illustrate the methodology by using daily three and six month Treasury Bill data, from January 1965 to July 1995, to estimate the drift and diffusion of the short rate, and the market price of interest rate risk. While the estimated diffusion is similar to that estimated by Chan, Karolyi, Longstaff, and Sanders (1992) , there is evidence of substantial nonlinearity in the drift. This is close to zero for low and medium interest rates, but mean reversion increases sharply at higher interest rates.

In a duopoly model of informed speculation, we show that overconfidence may strictly dominate rationality since an overconfident trader may not only generate higher expected profit and utility than his rational opponent, but also higher than if he were also rational. This occurs because overconfidence acts like a commitment device in a standard Cournot duopoly. As a result, for some parameter values the Nash equilibrium of a two‐fund game is a Prisoner's Dilemma in which both funds hire overconfident managers. Thus, overconfidence can persist and survive in the long run.

Textbook arbitrage in financial markets requires no capital and entails no risk. In reality, almost all arbitrage requires capital, and is typically risky. Moreover, professional arbitrage is conducted by a relatively small number of highly specialized investors using other people's capital. Such professional arbitrage has a number of interesting implications for security pricing, including the possibility that arbitrage becomes ineffective in extreme circumstances, when prices diverge far from fundamental values. The model also suggests where anomalies in financial markets are likely to appear, and why arbitrage fails to eliminate them.

Partial table of contents: AN INTRODUCTION TO CORPORATE FINANCE The Objective Function in Corporate Finance Present Value Understanding Financial Statements Risk and Return in Practice: Estimation of Discount Rates INVESTMENT ANALYSIS Capital Budgeting Decision Rules Estimating Cash Flows Issues in Capital Budgeting Uncertainty and Risk in Capital Budgeting: Part I. The Leasing Decision THE FINANCING DECISION Market Efficiency Lessons for Corporate Finance Capital Structure: Models and Applications Capital Structure The Financing Details THE DIVIDEND DECISION A Framework for Analyzing Dividend Policy VALUATION Basics of Valuation Acquisitions and Takeovers OTHER TOOLS AND TECHNIQUES International Finance Option Pricing Theory Applications of Option Pricing Theory in Corporate Finance Risk Management Corporate Finance for Privately Held Firms.

This article develops a multi‐factor econometric model of the term structure of interest‐rate swap yields. The model accommodates the possibility of counterparty default, and any differences in the liquidities of the Treasury and Swap markets. By parameterizing a model of swap rates directly, we are able to compute model‐based estimates of the defaultable zero‐coupon bond rates implicit in the swap market without having to specify a priori the dependence of these rates on default hazard or recovery rates. The time series analysis of spreads between zero‐coupon swap and treasury yields reveals that both credit and liquidity factors were important sources of variation in swap spreads over the past decade.