Knowledge that Transforms

This paper applies a contingent claims approach to examine the duration of a zero coupon bond subject to default risk. One replicating portfolio for a default‐prone zero coupon bond contains a long position in the default‐free asset plus a short position in a put option on the underlying assets. The duration of the bond is shown to be a weighted combination of the duration of the default‐free bond and the put option. The duration is less than maturity and is not an immunizing duration. The technique is then extended to subordinated debt.

Exact small sample population moments of the standard serial covariance and variance estimators are derived under the assumptions of the Roll bid/ask spread model. Noise explains why serial covariance estimates are often positive in annual samples of daily and weekly returns. Small sample estimator bias partially explains why weekly estimates are more negative than daily estimates. Noise causes the Roll spread estimator to be severely biased by Jensen's inequality. The French‐Roll adjusted variance estimator is unbiased but noisy. Empirical tests confirm the major implications.

This paper develops and empirically tests a two-factor model for pricing financial and real assets contingent on the price of oil. The factors are the spot price of oil and the instantaneous convenience yield. The parameters of the model are estimated using weekly oil futures contract prices from January 1984 to November 1988, and the model's performance is assessed out of sample by valuing futures contracts over the period November 1988 to May 1989. Finally, the model is applied to determine the present values of one barrel of oil deliverable in one to ten years time.

This paper examines the effects of stock splits on bid‐ask spreads for NYSE‐listed companies. Percentage spreads increase after splits, representing a liquidity cost to investors. These spread increases are directly related to decreases in share prices following splits and can explain part, but not all, of the observed increase in return variability after splits. The evidence thus suggests a liquidity cost of stock splits that must be weighed against any other perceived benefits of splits. Such a liquidity cost may validate that stock splits are a signal of favorable information about the firm.

This is a volume on the increasingly important topic of hostile corporate takeover attempts. The book is divided into six sections: Capital markets, efficiency and corporate control; Managerial behaviour and takeovers; Evidence on the gains from takeovers; Mergers and takeovers - taxes, capital structure and the incentive of managers; Legal rules, takeover strategies and defensive tactics (including a chapter on the regulation of take-overs in Great Britain); One-share one-vote. Students of business studies and business law.

This paper presents evidence that the distribution of target ownership is related to the division of the takeover gain between the target and the bidder for a sample of successful tender offers. In the whole sample, the target's gain is negatively related to bidder and institutional ownership. In the sample of multiple-bidder contests, the target's gain increases with managerial ownership and falls with institutional ownership.

This paper provides evidence that all‐equity firms exhibit greater levels of managerial stockholdings, more extensive family relationships among top management, and higher liquidity positions than a matched sample of levered firms. Further, top managers of all‐equity firms with family involvement in corporate operations have greater control of corporate voting rights than managers of all‐equity firms without family involvement. These findings are consistent with the interpretation that managerial control of voting rights and family relationships among senior managers are important factors in the decision to eliminate leverage.

This paper examines the variance of hourly market returns during 1964–1989. Results indicate that return volatility falls from the opening hour until early afternoon and rises thereafter and is significantly greater for intraday versus overnight periods. Market variance is also shown to change significantly over time, rising after NASDAQ began in 1971, rising after trading in stock options began in 1973, falling after fixed commissions were eliminated in 1975, rising after trading in stock index futures was introduced in 1982, and falling after margin requirements for stock index futures became larger in 1988.