Knowledge that Transforms

There is now considerable evidence suggesting that estimated betas of unconditional capital asset pricing models (CAPMs) exhibit statistically significant time variation. Therefore, many have advocated the use of conditional CAPMs. If we succeed in capturing the dynamics of beta risk, we are sure to outperform constant beta models. However, if the beta risk is inherently misspecified, there is a real possibility that we commit serious pricing errors, potentially larger than with a constant traditional beta model. In this paper we show that this is indeed the case, namely that pricing errors with constant traditional beta models are smaller than with conditional CAPMs.

The empirical analysis examines the salary and publication records of 311 finance professors at public research universities to calculate the worth of a top finance journal article. Within rank, salary regressions provide measures of the direct returns of a journal publication, while probit models consider the indirect returns that result from promotion. Ultimately, the analysis uses a reduced form salary equation to measure both the direct and indirect effects of publishing a journal article. Depending on professorial rank, the present value of the first top finance journal article is between extbackslash19,493 and extbackslash33,754, with the additional result of large returns to subsequent publications.

We use cross-sectional regressions to study how a firm's value is related to dividends and debt. With a good control for profitability, the regressions can measure how the taxation of dividends and debt affects firm value. Simple tax hypotheses say that value is negatively related to dividends and positively related to debt. We find the opposite. We infer that dividends and debt convey information about profitability (expected net cash flows) missed by a wide range of control variables. This information about profitability obscures any tax effects of financing decisions.

This paper examines betting line changes from the opening to the closing of the point spread betting market on National Basketball Association games for evidence of informed trader betting. We show that within-betting period line changes significantly improve the accuracy of betting lines as forecasts of game outcomes. We examine individual line change magnitudes and show that these are directly and proportionately related to biases in opening lines. Further, line changes are of sufficient magnitude to remove these biases by the close of betting. We interpret these results as evidence that informed traders are influential in this market.

Derman and Kani (1994), Dupire (1994), and Rubinstein (1994) hypothesize that asset return volatility is a deterministic function of asset price and time, and develop a deterministic volatility function (DVF) option valuation model that has the potential of fitting the observed cross section of option prices exactly. Using S&P 500 options from June 1988 through December 1993, we examine the predictive and hedging performance of the DVF option valuation model and find it is no better than an ad hoc procedure that merely smooths Black–Scholes (1973) implied volatilities across exercise prices and times to expiration.

Drawing on a comprehensive sample of 330 bankruptcy petition filings from 1980 to 1993, we find that most of the market reaction does not occur on the bankruptcy petition filing date when the information becomes publicly available. Rather, most of the reaction occurs when news of the bankruptcy filing is more widely disseminated via the Broadtape. This “Broadtape announcement effect” persists after controlling for firm size, exchange listing, and predisclosure information. These are primarily timing differences since abnormal returns cumulated over an 11–day window centered on the filing date do not differ significantly across Broadtape disclosure date classifications.

Using an improved measure of a common stock's annualized dividend yield, we document that risk-adjusted NYSE stock returns increase in dividend yield during the period from 1963 to 1994. This relation between return and yield is robust to various specifications of multifactor asset pricing models that incorporate the Fama–French factors. The magnitude of the yield effect is too large to be explained by a “tax penalty” on dividend income and is not explained by previously documented anomalies. Interestingly, the effect is primarily driven by smaller market capitalization stocks and zero-yield stocks.

Issuers of initial public offerings (IPOs) can report earnings in excess of cash flows by taking positive accruals. This paper provides evidence that issuers with unusually high accruals in the IPO year experience poor stock return performance in the three years thereafter. IPO issuers in the most “aggressive” quartile of earnings managers have a three-year aftermarket stock return of approximately 20 percent less than IPO issuers in the most “conservative” quartile. They also issue about 20 percent fewer seasoned equity offerings. These differences are statistically and economically significant in a variety of specifications.

Venture capital distributions, a legal form of insider trading, provides an ideal arena for examining the share price impact of transactions by informed parties. These sales, which occur after substantial run-ups in share value, generate a substantial price reaction immediately around the event. In the months after distribution, returns apparently continue to be negative. When the short- and long-run reactions are decomposed, they are consistent with the view that venture capitalists use inside information to time stock distributions: Distributions of firms brought public by lower quality underwriters and of less seasoned firms have more negative price reactions.

People are overconfident. Overconfidence affects financial markets. How depends on who in the market is overconfident and on how information is distributed. This paper examines markets in which price‐taking traders, a strategic‐trading insider, and risk‐averse marketmakers are overconfident. Overconfidence increases expected trading volume, increases market depth, and decreases the expected utility of overconfident traders. Its effect on volatility and price quality depend on who is overconfident. Overconfident traders can cause markets to underreact to the information of rational traders. Markets also underreact to abstract, statistical, and highly relevant information, and they overreact to salient, anecdotal, and less relevant information.