Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate Grossman and Laroque's (1990) conjecture that costs of adjusting consumption can account, in part, for the empirical failure of the consumption‐based capital asset pricing model (CCAPM). We incorporate small fixed costs of consumption adjustment into a CCAPM with heterogeneous agents. We find that undetectably small consumption adjustment costs can account for much of the discrepancy between the observed variance of nondurable aggregate consumption growth and the predictions of the CCAPM, and can partially reconcile nondurable consumption data with the observed equity premium. We conclude that the CCAPM's implications are nonrobust to extremely small adjustment costs.

We model a market populated by two groups of boundedly rational agents: “newswatchers” and “momentum traders.” Each newswatcher observes some private information, but fails to extract other newswatchers' information from prices. If information diffuses gradually across the population, prices underreact in the short run. The underreaction means that the momentum traders can profit by trend‐chasing. However, if they can only implement simple (i.e., univariate) strategies, their attempts at arbitrage must inevitably lead to overreaction at long horizons. In addition to providing a unified account of under‐ and overreactions, the model generates several other distinctive implications.

In this paper, I set up scenarios where the mean‐variance capital asset pricing model is true and where it is false. Then I investigate whether the coefficients from regressions of population expected excess returns on population betas, and expected excess returns on betas and size, allow us to distinguish between the scenarios. I show that the coefficients from either ordinary least squares or generalized least squares regressions do not allow us to tell whether the model is true or false.

By partitioning quoted depth into the specialist's contribution and the limit order book's contribution, the paper investigates whether specialists manage quoted depth to reduce adverse selection risk. The results show that both specialists and limit order traders reduce depth around information events, thereby reducing their exposure to adverse selection costs. Moreover, specialists' quotes may reflect only the limit order book on the side (or sides) of the market where they believe there is a chance of informed trading. Changes in quoted depth are consistent with specialists managing their inventory as well as having knowledge of the stock's future value.

For corporations facing tax‐function convexity, hedging lowers expected tax liabilities, thereby providing an incentive to hedge. We use simulation methods to investigate convexity induced by tax‐code provisions. On average, the tax function is convex (although in approximately 25 percent of cases it is concave). Carrybacks and carryforwards increase the range of income with incentives to hedge; other tax‐code provisions have minor impacts. Among firms facing convex tax functions, average tax savings from a five percent reduction in the volatility of taxable income are about 5.4 percent of expected tax liabilities; in extreme cases, these savings exceed 40 percent.

How does increased noise trading affect market liquidity and trading costs? We use The Wall Street Journal's “Investment Dartboard” column, which stimulates noise trading, as a natural experiment to evaluate models of the bid‐ask spread. We find that substantial increases in trading volume and significant but temporary abnormal returns occur when analysts recommend stocks in this column, especially when recommendations come from analysts with successful contest track records. We also find an increase in liquidity and a decrease in the adverse selection component of the bid‐ask spread.

The practices of preferencing and internalization have been alleged to support collusion, cause worse execution, and lead to wider spreads in dealership style markets relative to auction style markets. For a sample of London Stock Exchange stocks, we find that preferenced trades pay higher spreads, however they do not generate higher dealer profits. Internalized trades pay lower, not higher, spreads. We do not find a relation between the extent of preferencing or internalization and spreads across stocks. These results do not lend support to the “collusion” hypothesis but are consistent with a “costly search and trading relationships” hypothesis.

Are nominal bonds appropriately discounted for taxes? Empirical estimates of the response of nominal interest rates to changes in inflation, the Fisher effect, have failed to produce a definitive answer. Four reasons have been put forward as possible explanations: (i) Tobin effects, (ii) fiscal illusion, (iii) peso problems, and (iv) different estimators. Utilizing data on taxable and tax‐exempt bond interest rates and several different estimators, we find that the Fisher effect estimates are always larger for the taxable bond relative to the tax‐exempt bond, suggesting that fiscal illusion and different estimators cannot account for the previous results.

ABSTRACT We document strong positive correlation between changes in institutional ownership and returns measured over the same period. The result suggests that either institutional investors positive‐feedback trade more than individual investors or institutional herding impacts prices more than herding by individual investors. We find evidence that both factors play a role in explaining the relation. We find no evidence, however, of return mean‐reversion in the year following large changes in institutional ownership—stocks institutional investors purchase subsequently outperform those they sell. Moreover, institutional herding is positively correlated with lag returns and appears to be related to stock return momentum.

We analyze the trading activity of the mutual fund industry from 1975 through 1994 to determine whether funds “herd” when they trade stocks and to investigate the impact of herding on stock prices. Although we find little herding by mutual funds in the average stock, we find much higher levels in trades of small stocks and in trading by growth‐oriented funds. Stocks that herds buy outperform stocks that they sell by 4 percent during the following six months; this return difference is much more pronounced among small stocks. Our results are consistent with mutual fund herding speeding the price‐adjustment process.