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Report of the Executive Secretary and Treasurer for the Fiscal Year Ending June 30, 2022

Journal of Finance 2023 78(2), 1219-1220 open access
Financial:The Association remains in a strong financial position with total assets of $24.7 million as of June 30, 2022.For the past fiscal year, operating income was $33,486.This is close to break-even for the AFA operations.However, it should be noted that there were no catering expenses or travel grants due to a 2022 virtual meeting.With interest, dividends, realized and unrealized capital gains and losses, the total income for the fiscal year was -$2,873,484.Due to stock market losses as reflected in the total income (loss), the Association's net assets decreased by about 10% from the previous fiscal year.Please note: For details,

Optimal Financial Transaction Taxes

Journal of Finance 2023 78(1), 5-61 open access
ABSTRACTThis paper characterizes the optimal transaction tax in an equilibrium model of financial markets. If investors hold heterogeneous beliefs unrelated to their fundamental trading motives and the planner calculates welfare using any single belief, a positive tax is optimal, regardless of the magnitude of fundamental trading. Under some conditions, the optimal tax is independent of the planner's belief. The optimal tax can be implemented by adjusting its value until total volume equals fundamental volume. Knowledge of (i) the share of nonfundamental trading volume and (ii) the semielasticity of trading volume to tax changes is sufficient to quantify the optimal tax.

Dynamic Contracting with Intermediation: Operational, Governance, and Financial Engineering

Journal of Finance 2023 78(5), 2779-2836 open access
ABSTRACT Private equity funds intermediate investment and affect portfolio firm performance by actively engaging in operational, governance, and financial engineering. We study this type of intermediation in a dynamic agency model in which an active intermediary raises funds from outside investors and invests in a firm run by an agent. Optimal contracting addresses moral hazard at the intermediary and firm levels. The intermediary's incentives to affect firm performance are strongest after poor performance, while the agent's incentives are strongest after good performance. We also show how financial engineering, that is, financial contracting with outside investors, interacts with operational and governance engineering.