Knowledge that Transforms

All‐cash homebuyers account for one‐third of U.S. home purchases between 1980 and 2017. We use multiple data sets and research designs to robustly estimate that mortgaged buyers pay an 11% premium over all‐cash buyers to compensate home sellers for mortgage transaction frictions. A dynamic, representative‐seller model implies only a 3% premium, which would suggest an 8% puzzle. Accounting for heterogeneity in selling conditions explains half of this difference, but a puzzle holds in conditions with high transaction risk. An experimental survey of U.S. homeowners replicates these patterns and suggests that belief distortions can explain the puzzle in these high‐risk states.

Examining the contractual disclosures during the sale of private‐label residential mortgage‐backed securities before the 2008 financial crisis, we find that textual contents in the risk‐factor section predict subsequent losses and yet were not reflected in pricing. Insurance companies, especially life insurers and insurers with low regulatory capital ratios, are more exposed to textual risks. Consistent with issuers hedging litigation risks with disclosure, we find that textual contents are associated with second‐lien underreporting and preissuance written communications. Overall, we find that investors neglected risks in the purportedly safe assets before the crisis.

This paper shows that the liquidation value of collateral depends on the interdependency between borrower and collateral risk. Using transaction‐level data on short‐term repurchase agreements (repo), we show that borrowers pay a premium of 1.1 to 2.6 basis points when their default risk is positively correlated with the risk of the collateral that they pledge. Moreover, we show that borrowers internalize this premium when making their collateral choices. Loan‐level credit registry data suggest that the results extend to the corporate loan market as well.

Policymakers frequently use guarantees to mitigate panic‐based runs in the financial system. We analyze a binary‐action coordination game under the global games framework and propose a novel intervention program that screens investors based on their heterogeneous beliefs about the system's stability. The program only attracts investors who are at the margin of running, and their participation boosts all investors' confidence in the financial system. Compared with government guarantee programs, our proposed program is as effective at mitigating runs but features two advantages: it costs less to implement and it is robust to moral hazard.

Political identity and partisanship are salient features of today's society. Using deeds records and voter rolls, we show that current residents are more likely to sell their homes when opposite‐party neighbors move in nearby than when unaffiliated or same‐party neighbors do. This is especially true when the new neighbors are politically active, consistent with an animosity between parties mechanism. We conclude that affective polarization is not limited to purely political settings and affects one of the household's most important financial decisions, their home transactions.

We document an unprecedented brain drain of Artificial Intelligence (AI) professors from universities from 2004 to 2018. We find that students from the affected universities establish fewer AI startups and raise less funding. The brain‐drain effect is significant for tenured professors, professors from top universities, and deep‐learning professors. Additional evidence suggests that unobserved city‐ and university‐level shocks are unlikely to drive our results. We consider several economic channels for the findings. The most consistent explanation is that professors' departures reduce startup founders' AI knowledge, which we find is an important factor for successful startup formation and fundraising.

We develop a model in which a firm's manager can voluntarily disclose to privately informed investors. In equilibrium, the manager only discloses sufficiently favorable news. If the manager is known to be informed but disclosure is costly, the probability of disclosure increases with market liquidity and the stock trades at a discount relative to expected cash flows. However, when investors are uncertain about whether the manager is informed, disclosure can decrease with market liquidity and the stock can trade at a premium relative to expected cash flows. Moreover, contrary to common intuition, public information can crowd in more voluntary disclosure.

The claim by Liu and Matthies (LM) that their macro news risk factor (NI) prices 51 portfolios (associated with four different portfolio groups) is not appropriate. In fact, their single‐factor model is successful only in explaining the momentum deciles, while producing strongly negative performance for the remaining groups. The pricing performance is more doubtful in the case of the alternative news factor (HNI), as the respective risk price is not identified. LM's conclusions stem from a combination of questionable empirical choices and misinterpretation of their results. Moreover, the NI model cannot explain prominent capital asset pricing model anomalies not considered in their study.

We study an economy with financial frictions in which a regulator designs a test that reveals outside information about a firm's quality to investors. The firm can also disclose verifiable inside information about its quality. We show that the regulator optimally aims for “public speech and private silence,” which is achieved with tests that give insiders an incentive to stay quiet. We fully characterize optimal tests by developing tools for Bayesian persuasion with incentive constraints, and use these results to derive novel guidance for the design of bank stress tests, as well as benchmarks for socially optimal corporate credit ratings.

Financial institutions received investments under the Troubled Asset Relief Program in a bad state of the world but repaid them in a relatively good state. We show that the recipients paid considerably lower returns to taxpayers compared to private‐market securities with similar risk over the same investment horizon, resulting in a subsidy of over $50 billion on the preferred equity investment by the government. Ex‐post renegotiation of contract terms limited the upside gains received by taxpayers in good times and contributed to the subsidy. These findings have important implications for the design and implementation of future bailouts. Our simple methodology for calculating the subsidy can be applied to evaluate the financial costs of other bailouts.