Knowledge that Transforms

A nonparametric statistical procedure is employed to examine the returns to speculators in wheat, corn, and soybeans futures markets. We find that the theory of normal backwardation is supported. Moreover, the presence of the risk premiums to speculators tends to be more prominent in recent years than in earlier years. We also find that large wheat speculators as a whole possessed some superior forecasting ability. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that commodity futures prices are unbiased estimates of the corresponding future spot prices.

James C. Van Horne, Of Financial Innovations and Excesses, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 40, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting American Finance Association, Dallas, Texas, December 28-30, 1984 (Jul., 1985), pp. 620-631

Currently, theories of financial futures hedging are based on either a portfolio‐choice approach or a duration approach. This article presents an alternative: a firm‐theoretic model of bank behavior with financial futures. Assuming the bank is uncertain about cash CD interest rates and the quantity of CDs it needs in the future, expressions for the optimal futures hedge are derived under constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion. The performance of these two strategies is estimated from 1981–1983 using either the recently developed CD futures contract or the T‐Bill futures contract. These results are also compared with the performance of a portfolio‐choice strategy and a routine hedging strategy. The analysis indicates that the CD futures market can serve a hedging purpose that is not served by the previously established T‐Bill futures market.

The 1980 Depository Institution Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) mandates that Regulation Q be phased out by 1986. With deregulation of interest rate ceilings, the cost of raising capital funds for commercial banks would become more volatile and more closely related with interest rates in the money and capital markets. Thus, value‐maximizing bank managers would need to be concerned not only with the internal risk, but also with the external risk in bank portfolio management decisions. Based upon the cash flow version of the capital asset pricing model, this paper analyzes the joint impact of interest rate deregulation and capital requirements on the portfolio behavior of a banking firm.

This paper analyzes and compares the valuation of two types of options that relate to the same asset: options on the asset itself and options on the futures on the asset. The early exercise privilege plays a central role in explaining the differences between the values of the two options. It is shown that in the case of a cash instrument that does not make interim payments, such as gold, the value of a call option on the spot is smaller than the call option on the futures contract; the opposite is true for put options. The early exercise boundaries, which characterize when it pays to exercise, are also compared and analyzed.

This paper examines the implications of the joint effects of insurance and taxes for the optimal corporate pension strategy. It is shown that neither the “mini‐max” nor the “maxi‐min” strategy advocated by previous authors is necessarily best in corporate pension management. In the presence of capital market imperfections, the analysis via a single‐period contingent‐claims model indicates that optimal corporate pension strategy in both asset‐allocation and funding decisions can be a noncorner interior solution.

An uninformed observer using the tools of mean variance and security market line analysis to measure the performance of a portfolio manager who has superior information is unlikely to be able to make any reliable inferences. While some positive results of a very limited nature are possible, e.g., when there is a riskless asset or when information is restricted to be “security specific,” in general anything is possible. In particular, a manager with superior information can appear to the observer to be below or above the security market line and inside or outside of the mean-variance efficient frontier, and any combination of these is possible.

The due‐on‐sale clause contained in most conventional home mortgage contracts is equivalent to a prepayment penalty equal to the difference between the face value and market value of the loan. We analyze a bilateral game with asymmetric information and show that the bank demands the full penalty unless the market value of the loan is sufficiently low. In that case, the bank demands a prepayment penalty which is independent of the market value of the loan in order to induce additional prepayments. We also demonstrate, by a risk‐sharing argument, that the due‐on‐sale clause is optimal in some settings, even though it eliminates some beneficial home sales.