Knowledge that Transforms

This paper studies a sample of large acquisitions completed between 1971 and 1982. By the end of 1989, acquirers have divested almost 44% of the target companies. We characterize the ex post success of the divested acquisitions and consider 34% to 50% of classified divestitures as unsuccessful. Acquirer returns and total (acquirer and target) returns at the acquisition announcement are significantly lower for unsuccessful divestitures than for successful divestitures and acquisitions not divested. Although diversifying acquisitions are almost four times more likely to be divested than related acquisitions, we do not find strong evidence that diversifying acquisitions are less successful than related ones.

Whether insider trading affects stock prices is central to both the current debate over whether insider trading is harmful or pervasive, and to the broader public policy issue of how best to regulate securities markets. Using previously unexplored data on illegal insider trading from the Securities and Exchange Commission, this paper finds that the stock market detects the possibility of informed trading and impounds this information into the stock price. Specifically, the abnormal return on an insider trading day averages 3%, and almost half of the pre‐announcement stock price run‐up observed before takeovers occurs on insider trading days. Both the amount traded by the insider and additional trade‐specific characteristics lead to the market's recognition of the informed trading.

We develop a multi‐period auction model in which multiple privately informed agents strategically exploit their long‐lived information. We show that such traders compete aggressively and cause most of their common private information to be revealed very rapidly. In the limit as the interval between auctions approaches zero, market depth becomes infinite and all private information is revealed immediately. These results are in contrast to those of Kyle (1985) in which the monopolistic informed trader causes his information to be incorporated into prices gradually, and, when the interval between auctions is vanishingly small, market depth is constant over time.

The behavior of time‐weighted bid–ask spreads over the trading day are examined. The plot of minute‐by‐minute spreads versus time of day has a crude reverse J ‐shaped pattern. Schwartz identifies four determinants of spreads: activity, risk, information, and competition. Using a linear regression model, a significant relationship between these same factors and intraday spreads is demonstrated, but dummy variables for time of day have a reverse J ‐shape. For given values of the activity, risk, information and competition measures, spreads are higher at the beginning and end of the day relative to the interior period.

We develop a two‐factor general equilibrium model of the term structure. The factors are the short‐term interest rate and the volatility of the short‐term interest rate. We derive closed‐form expressions for discount bonds and study the properties of the term structure implied by the model. The dependence of yields on volatility allows the model to capture many observed properties of the term structure. We also derive closed‐form expressions for discount bond options. We use Hansen's generalized method of moments framework to test the cross‐sectional restrictions imposed by the model. The tests support the two‐factor model.

This paper analyzes how mutual fund performance relates to past performance. These tests are based on a multiple portfolio benchmark that was formed on the basis of securities characteristics. We find evidence that differences in performance between funds persist over time and that this persistence is consistent with the ability of fund managers to earn abnormal returns.

This paper examines daily excess bond returns associated with announcements of additions to Standard and Poor's Credit Watch List, and to rating changes by Moody's and Standard and Poor's. Reliably nonzero average excess bond returns are observed for additions to Standard and Poor's Credit Watch List when an expectations model is used to classify additions as either expected or unexpected. Bond price effects are also observed for actual downgrade and upgrade announcements by rating agencies. Excluding announcements with concurrent disclosures weakens the results for downgrades, but not upgrades. The stock price effects of rating agency announcements are also examined and contrasted with the bond price effects.

This study examines whether security analysts underreact or overreact to prior earnings information, and whether any such behavior could explain previously documented anomalous stock price movements. We present evidence that analysts' forecasts underreact to recent earnings. This feature of the forecasts is consistent with certain properties of the naive seasonal random walk forecast that Bernard and Thomas (1990) hypothesize underlie the well‐known anomalous post‐earnings‐announcement drift. However, the underreactions in analysts' forecasts are at most only about half as large as necessary to explain the magnitude of the drift. We also document that the “extreme” analysts' forecasts studied by DeBondt and Thaler (1990) cannot be viewed as overreactions to earnings, and are not clearly linked to the stock price overreactions discussed in DeBondt and Thaler ( 1985 , 1987 ) and Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter (Forthcoming). We conclude that security analysts' behavior is at best only a partial explanation for stock price underreaction to earnings, and may be unrelated to stock price overreactions.