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Heterogeneous Expectations, Restrictions on Short Sales, and Equilibrium Asset Prices

Journal of Finance 1980
Under heterogeneous expectations, the mean–variance model of capital market equilibrium is employed to determine the effect restricting short sales has on equilibrium asset prices. Two equivalent markets differing only with respect to short sale restrictions are compared. It is shown that, in general, risky asset prices can either rise or fall due to short sale constraints. However, under a homogeneity of beliefs for the covariance matrix of future prices, short sale constraints will only increase risky asset prices.

On the Valuation of Federal Loan Guarantees to Corporations

Journal of Finance 1980 35(5), 1209-1221
Since 1956, Federal Loan Guarantee Programs have expanded to the point where recipients of guarantees represent most segments of the economy. Considerable debate centers on the determination of the magnitude of the liability of the Federal Government that is represented by these programs. This paper illustrates how option pricing techniques may be used to obtain estimates of the purely pecuniary costs of loan guarantees, interest saving to the firm on senior and junior debt, and implicit present value profitability indices of projects.

A Catastrophe Model of Bank Failure

Journal of Finance 1980 35(5), 1189-1207
Most models of bank failure have assumed that the path towards bankruptcy or insolvency is smooth and continuous. As a consequence a number of early‐warning systems have been suggested in the banking and financial literature to aid regulators in the identification of potential problem banks. However, these systems may be of little use when the path towards failure is explosive, involving a sudden crash or catastrophe. This paper seeks to examine such cases by applying the theory of catastrophes to bank failure. A model is developed to show how the interaction between bank management, regulators and depositors can induce catastrophic failure. It is argued that there is a crucial relationship between the power of regulatory intervention and depositors confidence levels which is both necessary and sufficient for catastrophe to occur. It is also argued that catastrophe appears to be more likely for large money market banks rather than small banks. Finally, some suggestions are made for regulatory policy and for further research in the area.