Knowledge that Transforms

We placed 85,000 retail trades in six retail brokerage accounts from December 2021 to June 2022 to validate the Boehmer et al. algorithm, which uses subpenny trade prices to identify and sign retail trades. The algorithm identifies 35% of our trades as retail, incorrectly signs 28% of identified trades, and yields uninformative order imbalance measures for 30% of stocks. We modify the algorithm by signing trades using the quoted spread midpoints. The quote midpoint method does not affect identification rates but reduces the signing error rates to 5% and provides informative order imbalance measures for all stocks.

We quantify the impact of risk‐based and nonrisk‐based intermediary constraints (IC) on the term structure of covered interest rate parity (CIP) violations. Using a stochastic discount factor (SDF) inferred from interest rate swaps, we value currency derivatives. The wedge between model‐implied and observed derivative prices reflects the impact of nonrisk‐based IC because our SDF incorporates risk‐based IC. There is no wedge at short horizons, while the wedge accounts for 40% of long‐term CIP violations. Consistent with IC theory, the wedge correlates with the shadow cost of intermediary capital, and the SDF‐implied interest rate is a weighted average of collateralized and uncollateralized interest rates.

We propose a novel factor model for option returns. Option exposures are estimated nonparametrically, and factor risk premia can vary nonlinearly with states. The model is estimated using regressions with minimal assumptions on factor and option return dynamics. We estimate the model using index options to characterize the conditional risk premia for factors of interest, such as the market return, market variance, tail and intermediary risk factors, higher moments, and the VIX term structure slope. Together, market return and variance explain more than 90% of option return variation. Unconditionally, the magnitude of the variance risk premium is plausible. It displays pronounced time variation, spikes during crises, and always has the expected sign.

We study when preferences for competition are a positive economic trait among high earners and the extent to which this trait can explain the gender gap in income among a master's degree in business administration (MBAs). Consistent with the experimental evidence, preferences for competition are a positive economic trait only for individuals who are not overconfident. Preferences for competition correlate with income only at graduation when bonuses are guaranteed and not a function of performance. Overconfident competition‐loving MBAs observe lower compensation and income growth, and experience greater exit from high‐reward industries and more frequent job interruptions. Preferences for competition do not explain the gender pay gap among MBAs.

We propose a model of post‐Great Financial Crisis (GFC) money markets and monetary policy implementation. In our framework, capital regulation may deter banks from intermediating liquidity derived from holding reserves to shadow banks. Consequently, money markets can be segmented, and the scarcity of Treasury bills available to shadow banks is the main driver of short‐term spreads. In this regime, open market operations have an inverse effect on net liquidity provision when swapping ample reserves for scarce T‐bills or repos. Our model quantitatively accounts for post‐2010 time series for repo rates, T‐bill yields, and the Fed's reverse repo facility usage.

The U.S. dollar appreciates in the run‐up to foreign exchange (FX) fixes and depreciates thereafter, tracing a W ‐shaped return pattern around the clock. Return reversals for the top nine traded currencies over a 21‐year period are pervasive and highly statistically significant, and they imply daily swings of more than one billion U.S. dollars based on spot volumes. Using natural experiments, we document the existence of a published reference rate determines the timing of intraday return reversals. We present evidence consistent with an inventory risk explanation whereby FX dealers intermediate unconditional demand for U.S. dollars at the fixes.

We study the impact of rising mortgage rates on mobility and labor reallocation. Using individual‐level credit record data and variation in the timing of mortgage origination, we show that a 1 percentage point decline in the difference between mortgage rates locked in at origination and current rates reduces moving by 9% overall and 16% between 2022 and 2024, and this relationship is asymmetric. Mortgage lock‐in also dampens flows in and out of self‐employment and the responsiveness to shocks to nearby employment opportunities that require moving, measured as wage growth within a 50‐ to 150‐mile ring and instrumented with a shift‐share instrument.

Conditional skewness of Treasury yields is an important indicator of the risks to the macroeconomic outlook. Positive skewness signals upside risk to interest rates during periods of accommodative monetary policy and an upward‐sloping yield curve, and vice versa. Skewness has substantial predictive power for future bond excess returns, high‐frequency interest rate changes around Federal Open Market Committee announcements, and survey forecast errors for interest rates. The estimated expectational errors, or biases in beliefs, are quantitatively important for statistical bond risk premia. These findings are consistent with a heterogeneous‐beliefs model in which one of the agents is wrong about consumption growth.

Do illegal insiders internalize legal risk? We address this question with hand‐collected data from 530 SEC (the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission) investigations. Using two plausibly exogenous shocks to expected penalties, we show that insiders trade less aggressively and earlier and concentrate on tips of greater value when facing a higher risk. The results match the predictions of a model where an insider internalizes the impact of trades on prices and the likelihood of prosecution and anticipates penalties in proportion to trade profits. Our findings lend support to the effectiveness of U.S. regulations' deterrence and the long‐standing hypothesis that insider trading enforcement can hamper price informativeness.

We experimentally study the transmission of subjective expectations into actions. Subjects in our experiment report valuations that are far too insensitive to their expectations, relative to the prediction from a frictionless model. We propose that the insensitivity is driven by a noisy cognitive process that prevents subjects from precisely computing asset valuations. The empirical link between subjective expectations and actions becomes stronger as subjective expectations approach rational expectations. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating weak transmission into belief‐based asset pricing models. Finally, we discuss how cognitive noise can provide a microfoundation for inelastic demand in the stock market.