Knowledge that Transforms

We use proprietary data on intraday transactions at a futures brokerage to analyze how implied leverage influences trading performance. Across all investors, leverage is negatively related to performance, due partly to increased trading costs and partly to forced liquidations resulting from margin calls. Defining skill out‐of‐sample, we find that relative performance differentials across unskilled and skilled investors persist. Unskilled investors' leverage amplifies losses from lottery preferences and the disposition effect. Leverage stimulates liquidity provision by skilled investors, and enhances returns. Although regulatory increases in required margins decrease skilled investors' returns, they enhance overall returns, and attenuate return volatility.

We study initiation of takeover auctions by potential buyers and the seller. A bidder's indication of interest reveals that she is optimistic about the target. If bidders' values have a substantial common component, as in takeover battles between financial bidders, this effect disincentivizes bidders from indicating interest, and auctions are seller‐initiated. Conversely, in private‐value auctions, such as battles between strategic bidders, equilibria can feature both seller‐ and bidder‐initiated auctions, with the likelihood of the latter decreasing in commonality of values and the probability of a forced sale by the seller. We also relate initiation to bids and auction outcomes.

We provide a simple model of investment by a firm funded with debt and equity and empirical evidence to demonstrate that, once we control for the debt overhang problem with credit spreads, asset volatility is an unambiguously positive signal for investment, while equity volatility sends a mixed signal: Elevated volatility raises the option value of equity and increases investment for financially sound firms, but exacerbates debt overhang and decreases investment for firms close to default. Our study provides a simple unified understanding of the structural and empirical relationships between investment, credit spreads, equity versus asset volatility, leverage, and Tobin's .

We study the recent Australian experience with yield curve control (YCC) as perhaps the best evidence of how this policy might work in other developed economies. YCC seemingly worked well in 2020, when the market expected short rates to stay at zero for a long period of time. As the global recovery and inflation gained momentum in 2021, liftoff expectations moved up, the Reserve Bank of Australia purchased most of the targeted government bond outstanding, and the target bond's yield dislocated from other financial market instruments. The evidence suggests that central bank bond purchase programs can operate more narrowly than previously considered.

We examine a dynamic disclosure model in which the value of a firm follows a random walk. Every period, with some probability, the manager learns the firm's value and decides whether to disclose it. The manager maximizes the market perception of the firm's value, which is based on disclosed information. In equilibrium, the manager follows a threshold strategy with thresholds below current prices. He sometimes reveals pessimistic information that reduces the market perception of the firm's value. He does so to reduce future market uncertainty, which is valuable even under risk‐neutrality.

We provide estimates of Treasury convenience premia across the entire term structure of Treasury bills, notes, and bonds over more than a quarter of a century and document a variety of key stylized facts about their time‐series and cross‐sectional patterns. These results raise concerns about the evolving nature of Treasury markets and suggest that investors may now place less weight on the traditional role of Treasury securities as liquid trading vehicles. These stylized facts provide empirical benchmarks that could help guide future theoretical and empirical work about the economics of safe assets in financial markets.

Investments in international fixed‐income securities are exposed to significant currency risks. We collect novel data on currency derivatives used by U.S. international fixed‐income funds. We document that while 90% of funds use currency forwards, they hedge, on average, only 18% of their currency exposure. Funds' currency forward positions differ substantially based on risk management demands related to portfolio currency exposure, return‐enhancement motives such as currency momentum and carry trade, and strategic considerations related to past performance and fund clientele. Funds that hedge their currency risk exhibit lower return variability, but do not generate inferior abnormal returns.

Domestically listed Chinese (A‐share) firms have lower stock returns than externally listed Chinese, developed, and emerging country firms during 2000 to 2018. They also have lower net cash flows than matched unlisted Chinese firms. The underperformance of both stock and accounting returns is more pronounced for large A‐share firms, while small firms show no underperformance along either dimension. Investor sentiment explains low stock returns in the cross‐country and within‐A‐share samples. Institutional deficiencies in listing and delisting processes and weak corporate governance in terms of shareholder value creation are consistent with the underperformance in stock returns and net cash flows.

Economic interactions often involve sequential actions, observational learning, and contingent project implementation. We incorporate all‐or‐nothing thresholds in a canonical model of information cascades. Early supporters effectively delegate their decisions to a “gatekeeper,” resulting in unidirectional cascades without herding on rejections. Project proposers can consequently charge higher prices. Proposal feasibility, project selection, and information aggregation all improve, even when agents can wait. Equilibrium outcomes depend on crowd size, and project implementation and information aggregation achieve efficiency in the large‐crowd limit. Our key insights hold under thresholds in dollar amounts and alternative equilibrium selection, among other model extensions.

We develop a model of bailout stigma in which accepting a bailout signals a firm's balance‐sheet weakness and reduces its funding prospects. To avoid stigma, high‐quality firms withdraw from subsequent financing after receiving bailouts or refuse bailouts altogether to send a favorable signal. The former leads to a short‐lived stimulation followed by a market freeze even worse than if there were no bailout. The latter revives the funding market, albeit with delay, to the level achievable without any stigma and implements a constrained optimal outcome. A menu of multiple bailout programs compounds bailout stigma and exacerbates the market freeze.