Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT The tests reported here differ in several ways from those of most other papers testing option pricing models: an extremely large sample of observations of both trades and bid‐ask quotes is examined, careful consideration is given to discarding misleading records, nonparametric rather than parametric statistical tests are used, reported results are not sensitive to measurement of stock volatility, special care is taken to incorporate the effects of dividends and early exercise, a simple method is developed to test several option pricing formulas simultaneously, and the statistical significance and consistency across subsamples of the most important reported results are unusually high. The three key results are: (1) short‐maturity out‐of‐the‐money calls are priced significantly higher relative to other calls than the Black‐Scholes model would predict, (2) striking price biases relative to the Black‐Scholes model are also statistically significant but have reversed themselves after long periods of time, and (3) no single option pricing model currently developed seems likely to explain this reversal.

ABSTRACT This paper examines the daily stock market returns for four foreign countries. We find a so‐called “week‐end effect” in each country. In addition, the lowest mean returns for the Japanese and Australian stock markets occur on Tuesday. The remainder of the paper answers four questions. Are seasonal patterns in foreign stock markets independent of those previously reported in the U.S.? Do Japan and Australia exhibit a seasonal one day out of phase due to different time zones? Do settlement procedures across countries bias week‐end effects? Does the seasonal pattern in foreign exchange offset the week‐end effect in stocks for Americans investing overseas?

ABSTRACT The purpose of this study is to present a new classification procedure, Recursive Partitioning Algorithm (RPA), for financial analysis and to compare it with discriminant analysis within the context of firm financial distress. RPA is a computerized, nonparametric technique based on pattern recognition which has attributes of both the classical univariate classification approach and multivariate procedures. RPA is found to outperform discriminant analysis in most original sample and holdout comparisons. We also observe that additional information can be derived by assessing both RPA and discriminant analysis results.

ABSTRACT We extend the standard finance model of the firm's dividend/investment/financing decisions by allowing the firm's managers to know more than outside investors about the true state of the firm's current earnings. The extension endogenizes the dividend (and financing) announcement effects amply documented in recent research. But once trading of shares is admitted to the model along with asymmetric information, the familiar Fisherian criterion for optimal investment becomes time inconsistent: the market's belief that the firm is following the Fisher rule creates incentives to violate the rule. We show that an informationally consistent signalling equilibrium exists under asymmetric information and the trading of shares that restores the time consistency of investment policy, but leads in general to lower levels of investment than the optimum achievable under full information and/or no trading. Contractual provisions that change the information asymmetry or the possibility of profiting from it could eliminate both the time inconsistency and the inefficiency in investment policies, but these contractual provisions too are likely to involve dead-weight costs. Establishing which route or combination of routes serves in practice to maintain consistency remains for future research.

ABSTRACT Of late, concern has been expressed that American managers tend to make decisions that yield short‐term gains at the expense of the long‐term interests of the shareholders. In this paper, we have attempted to investigate managerial incentives for such decisions. We find that, when the manager has private information regarding his or her decisions, there exist situations wherein the manager has incentives to make decisions which yield short‐term profits but are not in the stockholders best interests. This incentive for suboptimal decisions arises because the manager, by taking decisions yielding short‐term profits, hopes to enhance his reputation earlier, thus boosting his wages. We also find that this incentive is inversely related to her experience, the duration of her contract, and the risk of the firm.

ABSTRACT Transactions costs invalidate the Black‐Scholes arbitrage argument for option pricing, since continuous revision implies infinite trading. Discrete revision using Black‐Scholes deltas generates errors which are correlated with the market, and do not approach zero with more frequent revision when transactions costs are included. This paper develops a modified option replicating strategy which depends on the size of transactions costs and the frequency of revision. Hedging errors are uncorrelated with the market and approach zero with more frequent revision. The technique permits calculation of the transactions costs of option replication and provides bounds on option prices.

ABSTRACT This paper conducts a theoretical and empirical investigation of the pricing (and portfolio) implications of investment barriers in the context of international capital markets. The postulated market structure—labelled “mildly segmented”—leads to the existence of “super” risk premiums for a subset of securities and to a breakdown of the standard separation result. The empirical study uses an extended data base including LDC markets and provides tentative support for the mild segmentation hypothesis.

Research in experimental psychology suggests that, in violation of Bayes' rule, most people tend to “overreact” to unexpected and dramatic news events. This study of market efficiency investigates whether such behavior affects stock prices. The empirical evidence, based on CRSP monthly return data, is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Substantial weak form market inefficiencies are discovered. The results also shed new light on the January returns earned by prior “winners” and “losers.” Portfolios of losers experience exceptionally large January returns as late as five years after portfolio formation.

ABSTRACT This paper provides a positive theory of voluntary disclosure by firms. Previous theoretical work on disclosure of new information by firms has demonstrated that releasing public information will often make all shareholders worse off, due to an adverse risk‐sharing effect. This paper uses a general equilibrium model with endogenous information collection to demonstrate that there exists a policy of disclosure of information which makes all shareholders better off than a policy of no disclosure. The welfare improvement occurs because of explicit information cost savings and improved risk sharing. This provides a positive theory of precommitment to disclosure, because it will be unanimously voted for by stockholders and will also represent the policy that will maximize value ex ante. In addition, it provides a “missing link” in financial signalling models. Apart from the effects on information production analyzed in this paper, most existing financial signalling models are inconsistent with a firm taking actions which facilitate future signalling because release of the signal makes all investors worse off.