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Optimal Asset Location and Allocation with Taxable and Tax‐Deferred Investing

Journal of Finance 2004 59(3), 999-1037
We investigate optimal intertemporal asset allocation and location decisions for investors making taxable and tax‐deferred investments. We show a strong preference for holding taxable bonds in the tax‐deferred account and equity in the taxable account, reflecting the higher tax burden on taxable bonds relative to equity. For most investors, the optimal asset location policy is robust to the introduction of tax‐exempt bonds and liquidity shocks. Numerical results illustrate optimal portfolio decisions as a function of age and tax‐deferred wealth. Interestingly, the proportion of total wealth allocated to equity is inversely related to the fraction of total wealth in tax‐deferred accounts.

Equilibrium Forward Curves for Commodities

Journal of Finance 2000 55(3), 1297-1338 open access
We develop an equilibrium model of the term structure of forward prices for storable commodities. As a consequence of a nonnegativity constraint on inventory, the spot commodity has an embedded timing option that is absent in forward contracts. This option's value changes over time due to both endogenous inventory and exogenous transitory shocks to supply and demand. Our model makes predictions about volatilities of forward prices at different horizons and shows how conditional violations of the ‘Samuelson effect’ occur. We extend the model to incorporate a permanent second factor and calibrate the model to crude oil futures data.

Would Order‐By‐Order Auctions Be Competitive?

Journal of Finance 2025 80(4), 1879-1927
We model two methods of executing segregated retail orders: brokers' routing, whereby brokers allocate orders using the market maker's overall performance, and order‐by‐order auctions, where market makers bid on individual orders, a recent U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission proposal. Order‐by‐order auctions improve allocative efficiency, but face a winner's curse reducing retail investor welfare, particularly when liquidity is limited. Additional market participants competing for retail orders fail to improve total efficiency and investor welfare when entrants possess information superior to incumbent wholesalers. Our results hold when new entrants are less informed or the information structure differs. We also examine the cross‐subsidization of brokers' routing.