Knowledge that Transforms

The issuer's decision to include warrants as compensation to underwriters is studied for a sample of 1,991 negotiated firm commitment issues of seasoned equity. Using a two-stage logit model to correct for self-selection bias, we find direct evidence that warrant compensation functions as a bond, substituting for reputational capital and enabling the underwriter to certify the issue price. To a lesser degree, the decision also is affected by regulations on underwriter compensation and on the use of underwriter warrants. Issuers' decisions are consistent with an objective of minimizing total underwriting cost, including cash compensation, warrants, and underpricing.

We analyze the effect of financing announcements of highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) on the stock prices of the banks that lead HLT-lending syndicates. For our sample of 41 HLTs, we document that the first HLT and bank financing announcements result in positive wealth effects for the lending banks. We also find that these wealth effects are lower in 1985, for smaller HLTs, and for banks with a high loan loss reserve to total asset ratio. Finally, we report that Leveraged Buyout (LBO) targets gain about 2 percent, whereas leveraged recap targets lose about 2 percent, when the first bank financing agreement is announced.

A cash-in-advance model of a monetary economy is used to derive a money-based CAPM (M-CAPM), which allows us to implement tests of asset pricing restrictions without consumption data. A test as in Fama and MacBeth of the model suggests that the money betas have some explanatory power for the cross-sectional variation of expected returns; however, the model is rejected using conditional information. Consistent with our predictions, estimates of the curvature parameter are lower than those of the consumption CAPM (C-CAPM) and pricing errors of the M-CAPM tend to be smaller than those of the C-CAPM.