Knowledge that Transforms

This article provides an analytical solution to the problem of an institution optimally managing the market risk of a given exposure by minimizing its Value‐at‐Risk using options. The optimal hedge consists of a position in a single option whose strike price is independent of the level of expense the institution is willing to incur for its hedging program. This optimal strike price depends on the distribution of the asset exposure, the horizon of the hedge, and the level of protection desired by the institution. Moreover, the costs associated with a suboptimal choice of exercise price are economically significant.

ABSTRACT We examine compensation contracts for managers in imperfectly competitive product markets. We show that strategic interactions among firms can explain the lack of relative performance‐based incentives in which compensation decreases with rival firm performance. The need to soften product market competition generates an optimal compensation contract that places a positive weight on both own and rival performance. Firms in more competitive industries place greater weight on rival firm performance relative to own firm performance. We find empirical evidence of a positive sensitivity of compensation to rival firm performance that is increasing in the degree of competition in the industry.

This paper analyzes the equity‐portfolio recommendations made by investment newsletters. Overall, there is no significant evidence of superior stock‐picking ability for this sample of 153 newsletters. Moreover, there is no evidence of abnormal short‐run performance persistence (“hot hands”). The comprehensive and bias‐free transactions database also allows for insights into the precision of performance evaluation. Using a measure of precision defined in the paper, a transactions‐based approach yields a median improvement of 10 percent over a corresponding factor model. This compares favorably with the precision gained by adding factors to the CAPM.

ABSTRACT We model a market populated by two groups of boundedly rational agents: “newswatchers” and “momentum traders.” Each newswatcher observes some private information, but fails to extract other newswatchers' information from prices. If information diffuses gradually across the population, prices underreact in the short run. The underreaction means that the momentum traders can profit by trend‐chasing. However, if they can only implement simple (i.e., univariate) strategies, their attempts at arbitrage must inevitably lead to overreaction at long horizons. In addition to providing a unified account of under‐ and overreactions, the model generates several other distinctive implications.

ABSTRACT We analyze the impact of a contract's length, callability, amortization, and original discount by arbitrage methods. Among instruments that are callable without penalty, longer instruments command a higher interest rate because the borrower possesses the option of repaying relatively more slowly. However, the rate on longer self‐amortizing loans cannot be substantially larger than for shorter ones because the payments decrease with contract length. Bounds on the trade‐off between points and rate for callable debt are characterized using the trade‐off for noncallable debt and the property that the value of the prepayment option increases with the loan's interest rate.

Our main goal is to investigate the question of which interest‐rate options valuation models are better suited to support the management of interest‐rate risk. We use the German market to test seven spot‐rate and forward‐rate models with one and two factors for interest‐rate warrants for the period from 1990 to 1993. We identify a one‐factor forward‐rate model and two spot‐rate models with two factors that are not significantly outperformed by any of the other four models. Further rankings are possible if additional criteria are applied.