Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT We study aversion to model ambiguity and misspecification in dynamic portfolio choice. Risk‐averse investors (relative risk aversion ) fear return persistence, while risk‐tolerant investors () fear mean reversion, when confronting model misspecification concerns of identically and independently distributed (IID) returns. The intuition is that risk‐averse investors, who want to hedge intertemporally, endogenously fear return persistence, which precludes hedging. A log investor is myopic and unaffected by model misspecification, therefore only worrying about model ambiguity. Our model can generate belief scarring, nonparticipation in equity markets, and extrapolative return expectations. Extending beyond IID returns, we study model misspecification for a mean‐reverting Sharpe ratio.

ABSTRACT Using unique, daily, account‐level data, we investigate deposit outflows and inflows in a distressed bank. We observe an outflow of uninsured depositors following bad regulatory news. Both regular and temporary deposit insurance reduce outflows. We provide important new evidence that, simultaneous with deposit outflows, deposit inflows are first order. Uninsured deposit outflows were largely offset with new insured deposit inflows as the bank approached failure, with the bank increasing term deposit rates. This phenomenon holds in a large sample of banks that faced regulatory action, suggesting that insured deposit inflows are an important mechanism that weakens depositor discipline.

ABSTRACT We examine the relative pricing of nominal Treasury bonds and Treasury inflation‐protected securities in the presence of U.S. default risk. Hedged breakeven inflation is significantly positively related to U.S. default risk, driven by correlation between shocks to default risk and both shocks to inflation swap premia and Treasury yields. To understand the mechanisms through which default risk is related to inflation swaps and sovereign yields, we estimate an affine term structure model to capture their joint dynamics. Our estimation implies that the interaction between inflation dynamics and default is the primary source of differential pricing.

ABSTRACT Comparing mortgage rates that borrowers obtain to rates that lenders could offer for the same loan, we find that many homeowners significantly overpay for their mortgage, with overpayment varying across borrower types and with market interest rates. Survey data reveal that borrowers' mortgage knowledge and shopping behavior strongly correlate with the rates they secure. We also document substantial variation in how expensive and profitable lenders are, without any evidence that expensive loans are associated with a better borrower experience. Despite many lenders operating in the U.S. mortgage market, limited borrower sophistication may provide lenders with market power.

ABSTRACT We show that incorporating defined benefit pension funds in an incomplete markets asset pricing model improves its ability to match the historical equity premium and riskless rate and has important risk‐sharing implications. We document the importance of the pension fund's size and asset demands, and a new risk channel arising from fluctuations in the fund's returns. We use our calibrated model to study the implications of a shift to an economy with defined contribution plans. The new steady state is characterized by a higher riskless rate and a lower equity premium. Consumption volatility increases for retirees but decreases for workers.

ABSTRACT We propose a measure of the valuation gap between debt and equity—debt‐equity spread (DES)—based on the difference between actual and equity‐implied credit spreads. DES predicts cross‐sectional stock and bond returns in opposite directions. This predictability is unique compared to existing mispricing measures and cannot be explained by exposures to various risk factors. High‐DES firms are more likely to issue equity and retire debt, and have more insider equity selling. These findings are consistent with DES capturing relative mispricing between debt and equity, and provide empirical support for the model of partially segmented markets in Greenwood, Hanson, and Liao (2018, Review of Financial Studies 31, 3307–3343).

ABSTRACT We use large language models to analyze the content of 4,700 private meetings between a large active asset manager and its portfolio firms. The high‐level meetings convey mostly soft information about the firm, and little about industry or market. Fund manager meetings focus on business models and financial metrics, while governance specialist meetings focus on environmental, social, and governance risks; 0.4% of meetings discuss material nonpublic information. Trades by fund managers increase with meetings attended by senior management, rated as unusually good or bad, where the tone is significantly positive or negative, or assessed as creating consensus. Meeting‐informed portfolios can generate significant outperformance.

ABSTRACT This paper documents a new stylized fact: the cross‐sectional variation in CEO pay levels has declined precipitously in recent years. We offer one explanation for this decline, namely, firms are increasingly benchmarking CEO compensation to industry peers closest in size, thereby creating pay clusters. Our empirical tests provide support for this explanation and suggest that the rise of industry‐size benchmarking is driven by three institutional factors: the mandatory disclosure of compensation peer groups, proxy advisory influence, and say‐on‐pay regulation. Our findings highlight a consequence of adopting a one‐size‐fits‐all standard in the pay‐setting process.

ABSTRACT The link between corporate bond credit spreads and secondary market illiquidity in the cross section has grown stronger since 2005, resulting in a higher liquidity component in credit spreads. Using U.S. investor holdings data, we show that short‐term investors (e.g., mutual funds/exchange‐traded funds [ETFs]) increase trading activities in the secondary market, amplifying the effect of secondary market frictions on prices. We provide a model featuring heterogeneous investors with different trading needs and heterogeneous bonds to investigate the impact of the rapid‐growing mutual fund/ETF sector on the corporate bond market. We find the change in investor composition can quantitatively explain the aggregate trend.

ABSTRACT We use granular data from an investment firm and a credible identification strategy to estimate the effect of financial advisors' incentives on client investments. Exploiting a natural experiment triggered by the 2018 implementation of Markets in Financial Instruments Directive II (MiFID II), we find that clients' investments respond strongly to changes in advisor incentives. Advisors react through multiple mechanisms: (i) inducing existing clients to bring in new money, (ii) channeling it to high‐incentive funds, and (iii) attracting more new clients. We also find that the MiFID II reform generated more balanced incentives, which translated into higher portfolio efficiency through lower average fees and stronger portfolio diversification.