Knowledge that Transforms

Merton Miller's status as a father of finance reflects the academic depth, breadth, and rigor of his writings and two important facets of his character. Merton was a man of great warmth and humor. He communicated his often challenging views via memorable phrases and anecdotes that have become part of the everyday language of the profession. Merton was also a man of great dedication. The whole profession has benefited from his devotion to his doctoral students, to his colleagues, and to his coauthors. This essay demonstrates how Merton's admiration for markets provided the foundation for all his research.

Feedback from financial market prices to cash flows arises when a firm's nonfinancial stakeholders, for example, its customers, employees, and suppliers, make decisions that are contingent on the information revealed by the price. Complementarities across stakeholders result in cascades, wherein relatively small stock price moves trigger substantial changes in asset values. This paper analyzes the relation between such feedback effects and parameters such as the information cost, the volatility of existing projects, the risk aversion of liquidity suppliers, and the precision of managerial information.

This paper examines how risky labor income and retirement affect optimal portfolio choice. With idiosyncratic labor income risk, the optimal allocation to stocks is unambiguously larger for employed investors than for retired investors, consistent with the typical recommendations of investment advisors. Increasing idiosyncratic labor income risk raises investors' willingness to save and reduces their stock portfolio allocation towards the level of retired investors. Positive correlation between labor income and stock returns has a further negative effect and can actually reduce stockholdings below the level of retired investors.

One of the most puzzling features of currency prices is the forward premium anomaly : the tendency for high interest rate currencies to appreciate. We characterize the anomaly in the context of affine models of the term structure of interest rates. In affine models, the anomaly requires either that state variables have asymmetric effects on state prices in different currencies or that nominal interest rates take on negative values with positive probability. We find the quantitative properties of either alternative to have important shortcomings.

This paper explores the empirical relevance of banking market structure on growth. There is substantial evidence of a positive relationship between the level of development of the banking sector of an economy and its long‐run output growth. Little is known, however, about the role played by the market structure of the banking sector on the dynamics of capital accumulation. This paper provides evidence that bank concentration promotes the growth of those industrial sectors that are more in need of external finance by facilitating credit access to younger firms. However, we also find evidence of a general depressing effect on growth associated with a concentrated banking industry, which impacts all sectors and all firms indiscriminately.

Although traded as distinct products, caps and swaptions are linked by no‐arbitrage relations through the correlation structure of interest rates. Using a string market model, we solve for the correlation matrix implied by swaptions and examine the relative valuation of caps and swaptions. We find that swaption prices are generated by four factors and that implied correlations are lower than historical correlations. Long‐dated swaptions appear mispriced and there were major pricing distortions during the 1998 hedge‐fund crisis. Cap prices periodically deviate significantly from the no‐arbitrage values implied by the swaptions market.

In standard asset pricing theory, investors are assumed to invest directly in financial markets. The role of financial institutions is ignored. The focus in corporate finance is on agency problems. How do you ensure that managers act in shareholders' interests? There is an inconsistency in assuming that when you give your money to a financial institution there is no agency problem, but when you give it to a firm there is. It is argued that both areas need to take proper account of the role of financial institutions and markets. Appropriate concepts for analyzing particular situations should be used.

This paper analyzes 4,750 mergers from 1963 to 1998 to characterize the risk and return in risk arbitrage. Results indicate that risk arbitrage returns are positively correlated with market returns in severely depreciating markets but uncorrelated with market returns in flat and appreciating markets. This suggests that returns to risk arbitrage are similar to those obtained from selling uncovered index put options. Using a contingent claims analysis that controls for the nonlinear relationship with market returns, and after controlling for transaction costs, we find that risk arbitrage generates excess returns of four percent per year.

Existing theories of the term structure of swap rates provide an analysis of the Treasury–swap spread based on either a liquidity convenience yield in the Treasury market, or default risk in the swap market. Although these models do not focus on the relation between corporate yields and swap rates (the LIBOR–swap spread), they imply that the term structure of corporate yields and swap rates should be identical. As documented previously (e.g., in Sun, Sundaresan, and Wang (1993)) this is counterfactual. Here, we propose a model of the default risk imbedded in the swap term structure that is able to explain the LIBOR–swap spread. Whereas corporate bonds carry default risk, we argue that swap contracts are free of default risk. Because swaps are indexed on “refreshed”‐credit‐quality LIBOR rates, the spread between corporate yields and swap rates should capture the market's expectations of the probability of deterioration in credit quality of a corporate bond issuer. We model this feature and use our model to estimate the likelihood of future deterioration in credit quality from the LIBOR–swap spread. The analysis is important because it shows that the term structure of swap rates does not reflect the borrowing cost of a standard LIBOR credit quality issuer. It also has implications for modeling the dynamics of the swap term structure.

Proprietary data allow us to distinguish between institutional investors' orders directed to soft‐dollar brokers and those directed to other types of brokers. We find that soft‐dollar brokers execute smaller orders in larger market value stocks. Allowing for differences in order characteristics, we estimate the incremental implicit cost of soft‐dollar execution at 29 (24) basis points for buyer‐ (seller‐) initiated orders. For large orders, incremental implicit costs are 41 (30) basis points for buys (sells). However, we document substantial variability in these estimates, and research services provided by soft‐dollar brokers may at least partially offset these costs.