Knowledge that Transforms

We estimate the effects of deregulation of U.S. banking restrictions on interstate personal income insurance for the period 1970 to 2001. Interstate income insurance occurs when personal income reacts less than one‐to‐one to state‐specific output shocks. We find that insurance improved after banking deregulation, with a larger effect in states where small businesses are more important and on proprietors' income than on other components of personal income. Our explanation centers on the role of banks as a prime source of small business finance and on the close intertwining of the personal and business finances of small business owners.

We test the doubly stochastic assumption under which firms' default times are correlated only as implied by the correlation of factors determining their default intensities. Using data on U.S. corporations from 1979 to 2004, this assumption is violated in the presence of contagion or “frailty” (unobservable explanatory variables that are correlated across firms). Our tests do not depend on the time‐series properties of default intensities. The data do not support the joint hypothesis of well‐specified default intensities and the doubly stochastic assumption. We find some evidence of default clustering exceeding that implied by the doubly stochastic model with the given intensities.

We study the asset pricing implications of learning in an environment in which the true model of the world is a multivariate one, but agents update only over the class of simple univariate models. Thus, if a particular simple model does a poor job of forecasting over a period of time, it is discarded in favor of an alternative simple model. The theory yields a number of distinctive predictions for stock returns, generating forecastable variation in the magnitude of the value‐glamour return differential, in volatility, and in the skewness of returns. We validate several of these predictions empirically.

A number of firms in the United Kingdom list without issuing equity and then issue equity shortly thereafter. We argue that this two‐stage offering strategy is less costly than an initial public offering (IPO) because trading reduces the valuation uncertainty of these firms before they issue equity. We find that initial returns are 10% to 30% lower for these firms than for comparable IPOs, and we provide evidence that the market in the firm's shares lowers financing costs. We also show that these firms time the market both when they list and when they issue equity.

Explicit presence of reorganization in addition to liquidation leads to conflicts of interest between borrowers and lenders. In the first–best outcome, reorganization adds value to both parties via higher debt capacity, lower credit spreads, and improved overall firm value. If control of the ex ante reorganization timing and the ex post decision to liquidate is given to borrowers, most of the benefits are appropriated by borrowers ex post. Lenders can restore the first–best outcome by seizing this control or by the ex post transfer of control rights. Reorganization is more likely and liquidation is less likely relative to the benchmark case with liquidation only.

We describe how episodic illiquidity arises from a breakdown in cooperation between market participants. We first solve a one‐period trading game in continuous‐time, using an asset pricing equation that accounts for the price impact of trading. Then, in a multi‐period framework, we describe an equilibrium in which traders cooperate most of the time through repeated interaction, providing apparent liquidity to one another. Cooperation breaks down when the stakes are high, leading to predatory trading and episodic illiquidity. Equilibrium strategies that involve cooperation across markets lead to less frequent episodic illiquidity, but cause contagion when cooperation breaks down.

We test whether executive stock ownership affects firm payouts using the 2003 dividend tax cut to identify an exogenous change in the after‐tax value of dividends. We find that executives with higher ownership were more likely to increase dividends after the tax cut in 2003, whereas no relation is found in periods when the dividend tax rate was higher. Relative to previous years, firms that initiated dividends in 2003 were more likely to reduce repurchases. The stock price reaction to the tax cut suggests that the substitution of dividends for repurchases may have been anticipated, consistent with agency conflicts.

Legal and institutional differences shape the ownership and terms of bank loans across the world. We show that under strong creditor protection, loans have more concentrated ownership, longer maturities, and lower interest rates. Moreover, the impact of creditor rights on loans depends on borrower characteristics such as the size and tangibility of assets. Foreign banks appear especially sensitive to the legal and institutional environment, with their ownership declining relative to domestic banks as creditor protection falls. Our multidimensional empirical model paints a more complete picture of how financial contracts respond to the legal and institutional environment than existing studies.

We offer evidence that interest rate spreads on syndicated loans to corporate borrowers are economically significantly smaller in Europe than in the United States, other things equal. Differences in borrower, loan, and lender characteristics do not appear to explain this phenomenon. Borrowers overwhelmingly issue in their natural home market and bank portfolios display home bias. This may explain why pricing discrepancies are not competed away, though their causes remain a puzzle. Thus, important determinants of loan origination market outcomes remain to be identified, home bias appears to be material for pricing, and corporate financing costs differ across Europe and the United States.

Using 3 years of interest rate caps price data, we provide a comprehensive documentation of volatility smiles in the caps market. To capture the volatility smiles, we develop a multifactor term structure model with stochastic volatility and jumps that yields a closed‐form formula for cap prices. We show that although a three‐factor stochastic volatility model can price at‐the‐money caps well, significant negative jumps in interest rates are needed to capture the smile. The volatility smile contains information that is not available using only at‐the‐money caps, and this information is important for understanding term structure models.