ABSTRACT We analyze the effects of regulatory interference in compensation contracts, focusing on recent mandatory deferral and clawback requirements restricting incentive compensation of material risk‐takers in the financial sector. Moderate deferral requirements have a robustly positive effect on risk‐management effort only if the bank manager's outside option is sufficiently high; otherwise, their effectiveness depends on the dynamics of information arrival. Stringent deferral requirements unambiguously backfire. Our normative analysis characterizes whether and how deferral and clawback requirements should supplement capital regulation as part of the optimal policy mix.
ABSTRACT The average difference between the court value and postemergence market value of newly issued stocks in Chapter 11 reorganizations exceeds 50%. We show that public dissemination of transactions in defaulted bonds reduces this difference by 23% and largely eliminates interclaimant wealth transfers. The effects of dissemination are only significant when the bonds are sufficiently traded around the court valuation date and when they receive significant amounts of postemergence equity, indicating that the bond's value is sensitive to the size and allocation of the pie. These findings imply that security prices have real effects: they improve the valuations of bankruptcy participants.
ABSTRACT We quantify the role of global production linkages in explaining spillovers of U.S. monetary policy shocks on country‐sector stock returns. We estimate a structural spatial autoregression (SAR) model that is consistent with an open‐economy production network framework. Using the SAR model, we decompose the total impact of U.S. monetary policy on global stock returns into direct and network effects. Nearly 70% of the total impact is due to the network effect of global production linkages. Empirical counterfactuals show that shutting down global production linkages halves the total impact of U.S. monetary policy shocks.
ABSTRACT We document the importance of covenant violations in transmitting bank health to nonfinancial firms. Roughly one‐third of loans in our supervisory data breach a covenant during the 2008 to 2009 period, allowing lenders to force a renegotiation of loan terms or to accelerate repayment of otherwise long‐term credit. Lenders in worse health are more likely to force a reduction in the loan commitment following a violation. The reduction in credit to borrowers who violate a covenant can account for the majority of the cross‐sectional variation in credit supply during the 2008 to 2009 crisis.
ABSTRACT Textbook models assume that investors try to insure against bad states of the world associated with specific risk factors when investing. This is a testable assumption and we develop a survey framework for doing so. Our framework can be applied to any risk factor. We demonstrate the approach using consumption growth, which makes our results applicable to most modern asset‐pricing models. Participants respond to changes in the mean and volatility of stock returns consistent with textbook models, but we find no evidence that they view an asset's correlation with consumption growth as relevant to investment decisions.
ABSTRACT We examine how creditor protection affects firms with different levels of owners' and managers' personal costs of bankruptcy (PCB). Theoretically, we show that firms with high PCB borrow and invest more under a more debtor‐friendly management stay system, whereas firms with low PCB borrow and invest more under a more creditor‐friendly receivership system. Intuitively, stronger creditor protection relaxes financial constraints but reduces credit demand. Which effect dominates depends on owners' and managers' PCB. Empirically, we find support for these predictions using a Korean bankruptcy reform that replaced receivership with management stay.
ABSTRACT Using loan‐level data from Germany, we investigate how the introduction of model‐based capital regulation affected banks' ability to absorb shocks. The objective of this regulation was to enhance financial stability by making capital requirements responsive to asset risk. Our evidence suggests that banks “optimized” model‐based regulation to lower their capital requirements. Banks systematically underreported risk, with underreporting more pronounced for banks with higher gains from it. Moreover, large banks benefitted from the regulation at the expense of smaller banks. Overall, our results suggest that sophisticated rules may have undesired effects if strategic misbehavior is difficult to detect.
ABSTRACT This paper explores the role of trade invoicing currencies in the international spillover of monetary policy. Using high‐frequency measures of Federal Reserve monetary policy shocks, I show that exchange rates, interest rates, and equity returns in countries with a larger share of dollar‐invoiced imports systematically respond more to U.S. monetary policy. I document similar transmission effects from European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy shocks to countries with euro‐invoiced imports. I rationalize these findings within a New Keynesian framework. As a result of these spillovers, domestic monetary policy should be less effective in countries with traded goods invoiced in foreign currencies.
ABSTRACT Non‐deal roadshows (NDRs) are private meetings between management and institutional investors, typically organized by sell‐side analysts. We find that around NDRs, local institutional investors trade heavily and profitably, while retail trading is significantly less informed. Analysts who sponsor NDRs issue significantly more optimistic recommendations and target prices, together with more “beatable” earnings forecasts, consistent with analysts issuing strategically biased forecasts to win NDR business. Our results suggest that NDRs result in a substantial information advantage for institutional investors and create significant conflicts of interests for the analysts who organize them.
ABSTRACT Do financial crises radicalize voters? We study Germany's 1931 banking crisis, collecting new data on bank branches and firm‐bank connections. Exploiting cross‐sectional variation in precrisis exposure to the bank at the center of the crisis, we show that Nazi votes surged in locations more affected by its failure. Radicalization in response to the shock was exacerbated in cities with a history of anti‐Semitism. After the Nazis seized power, both pogroms and deportations were more frequent in places affected by the banking crisis. Our results suggest an important synergy between financial distress and cultural predispositions, with far‐reaching consequences.