Knowledge that Transforms

This study examines the behavior of laboratory markets in which two uninformed market makers compete to trade with heterogeneously informed investors. The data provide three main results. First, market makers set quotes to protect against adverse selection and to control inventory. Second, when investors are less well-informed, their trades are less reliable measures of their information, and market makers respond to those trades with greater skepticism. Third, errors in market makers' reactions to trades cause the time-series behavior of quotes and prices to depend on the information environment in ways beyond those captured in extant theory.

ABSTRACT We generalize the model of Ferguson and Peters (1995) to allow for unequal recovery rates in the event of default by majority borrowers versus minority borrowers. This simple extension has two direct implications: (i) a uniform credit policy, as defined by Ferguson and Peters, entails cross‐subsidization across groups; and (ii) it is possible for a profit‐maximizing (and therefore economically nondiscriminatory) lending policy to generate lower average default rates among minority borrowers than among majority borrowers.

Past research explains observed spreads between futures and forward Eurodollar yields as being due to the futures contract's mark-to-market feature. We derive closed form solutions for this yield spread and show that, theoretically, it should be small. Also, differences in liquidity, taxation, and default risk cannot account for the large spreads observed. We also present evidence that the spreads, which are nonnegligible primarily in the first half of the sample period, are likely to be attributable to the mispricing of futures contracts relative to the forward rates and that the mispricing was gradually eliminated over time.

Conrad and Kaul (1993) report that most of De Bondt and Thaler's (1985) long-term overreaction findings can be attributed to a combination of bid-ask effects when monthly cumulative average returns (CARs) are used, and price, rather than prior returns. In direct tests, we find little difference in test-period returns whether CARs or buy-and-hold returns are used, and that price has little predictive ability in cross-sectional regressions. The difference in findings between this study and Conrad and Kaul's is primarily due to their statistical methodology. They confound cross-sectional patterns and aggregate time-series mean reversion, and introduce a survivor bias. Their procedures increase the influence of price at the expense of prior returns.

We develop a method of measuring ex-ante real interest rates using prices of index and nominal bonds. Employing this method and newly available data, we directly test the Fisher hypothesis that the real rate of interest is independent of inflation expectations. We find a negative correlation between ex-ante real interest rates and expected inflation. This contradicts the Fisher hypothesis but is consistent with the theories of Mundell and Tobin, Darby and Feldstein, and Stulz. We also find that nominal interest rates include an inflation risk premium that is positively related to a proxy for inflation uncertainty.

This article examines a model in which decisions are made at fixed intervals and are unsynchronized across agents. Agents choose nondurable consumption and portfolio composition, and either or both can be chosen infrequently. A small utility cost is associated with both decisions being made infrequently. Calibrating returns to the U.S. economy, less frequent and unsynchronized decision-making delivers the low volatility of aggregate consumption growth and its low correlation with equity return found in U.S. data. Allowing portfolio rebalancing to occur every period has a negligible impact on the joint behavior of aggregate consumption and returns.

This study analyzes the main requirements placed on Central and Eastern Europe's financial systems during their transition to a market economy. It assesses the financial reforms already carried out in the countries of Central Europe, their adaptations of Western institutional models, and the lessons to be drawn from their experiences for the second wave reformers in the former Soviet Union and the Balkans.

ABSTRACT American corporations earn a significant share of their profits from foreign sources, out of which they appear to pay dividends at rates that are three times higher than their payout rates from domestic profits. Why firms do so is unclear, although this behavior is consistent with the use of dividends to signal profitability. This payout behavior implies that a significant part of the U.S. tax revenue generated by the foreign profits of U.S. corporations arises through the taxation of dividends received by individuals, and that the cost of capital may be higher for foreign than for domestic operations.