Knowledge that Transforms

We document that a trading strategy that is short the U.S. dollar and long other currencies exhibits significantly larger excess returns on days with scheduled Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announcements. We show that these excess returns (i) are higher for currencies with higher interest rate differentials vis‐à‐vis the United States, (ii) increase with uncertainty about monetary policy, and (iii) increase further when the Federal Reserve adopts a policy of monetary easing. We interpret these excess returns as compensation for monetary policy uncertainty within a parsimonious model of constrained financiers who intermediate global demand for currencies.

We build a macrofinance model of shadow banking—the transformation of risky assets into securities that are money‐like in quiet times but become illiquid when uncertainty spikes. Shadow banking economizes on scarce collateral, expanding liquidity provision, boosting asset prices and growth, but also building up fragility. A rise in uncertainty raises shadow banking spreads, forcing financial institutions to switch to collateral‐intensive funding. Shadow banking collapses, liquidity provision shrinks, liquidity premia and discount rates rise, asset prices and investment fall. The model generates slow recoveries, collateral runs, and flight‐to‐quality effects, and it sheds light on Large‐Scale Asset Purchases, Operation Twist, and other interventions.

We study the design of credit default swaps (CDS) auctions, which determine the payments by CDS sellers to CDS buyers following defaults of bonds. Using a simple model, we find that the current design of CDS auctions leads to biased prices and inefficient allocations. This is because various restrictions imposed in CDS auctions prevent certain investors from participating in the price discovery and allocation process. The imposition of a price cap or floor also gives dealers large influence on the final auction price. We propose an alternative double auction design that delivers more efficient price discovery and allocations.

Using corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings for 23,000 companies from 114 countries, we find that a firm's CSR rating and its country's legal origin are strongly correlated. Legal origin is a stronger explanation than “doing good by doing well” factors or firm and country characteristics (ownership concentration, political institutions, and globalization): firms from common law countries have lower CSR than companies from civil law countries, with Scandinavian civil law firms having the highest CSR ratings. Evidence from quasi‐natural experiments such as scandals and natural disasters suggests that civil law firms are more responsive to CSR shocks than common law firms.

This paper investigates value and growth investing in a large administrative panel of Swedish residents. We show that, over the life cycle, households progressively shift from growth to value as they become older and their balance sheets improve. Furthermore, investors with high human capital and high exposure to macroeconomic risk tilt their portfolios away from value. While several behavioral biases seem evident in the data, the patterns we uncover are overall remarkably consistent with the portfolio implications of risk‐based theories of the value premium.

Does trader leverage drive equity market liquidity? We use the unique features of the margin trading system in India to identify a causal relationship between traders’ ability to borrow and a stock's market liquidity. To quantify the impact of trader leverage, we employ a regression discontinuity design that exploits threshold rules that determine a stock's margin trading eligibility. We find that liquidity is higher when stocks become eligible for margin trading and that this liquidity enhancement is driven by margin traders’ contrarian strategies. Consistent with downward liquidity spirals due to deleveraging, we also find that this effect reverses during crises.

This paper examines the pricing of municipal bonds. I use three distinct, complementary approaches to decompose municipal bond spreads into default and liquidity components, and find that default risk accounts for 74% to 84% of the average spread after adjusting for tax‐exempt status. The first approach estimates the liquidity component using transaction data, the second measures the default component with credit default swap data, and the third is a quasi‐natural experiment that estimates changes in default risk around pre‐refunding events. The price of default risk is high given the rare incidence of municipal default and implies a high risk premium.

This paper provides an explanation for why garbage implies a much lower relative risk aversion in the consumption‐based asset pricing model than National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) consumption expenditure: Unlike garbage, NIPA consumption is filtered to mitigate measurement error. I apply a simple model of the filtering process that allows one to undo the filtering inherent in NIPA consumption. “Unfiltered NIPA consumption” well explains the equity premium and is priced in the cross‐section of stock returns. I discuss the likely properties of true consumption (i.e., without measurement error and filtering) and quantify implications for habit and long‐run risk models.

We present evidence of a risk‐taking channel of monetary policy for the U.S. banking system. We use confidential data on banks’ internal ratings on loans to businesses over the period 1997 to 2011 from the Federal Reserve's Survey of Terms of Business Lending. We find that ex ante risk‐taking by banks (measured by the risk rating of new loans) is negatively associated with increases in short‐term interest rates. This relationship is more pronounced in regions that are less in sync with the nationwide business cycle, and less pronounced for banks with relatively low capital or during periods of financial distress.

We show that a linear pure strategy equilibrium may not exist in the model of Madrigal (1996), contrary to the claim of the original paper. This is because Madrigal's characterization of a pure strategy equilibrium omits a second‐order condition. If the nonfundamental speculator's information about noise trading is sufficiently precise, a linear pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist. In parameter regions where a pure strategy equilibrium does exist, we identify a few calculation errors in Madrigal (1996) that result in misleading implications.