Knowledge that Transforms

I document a dramatic increase in the importance of two types of variation in Treasury bill yields beginning in the early 1980s. The first is idiosyncratic variation in individual short-maturity (less than three months) bill yields. The second is a common component in Treasury bill yields that is not shared by yields on other instruments, such as short-maturity privately-issued instruments or longer-maturity Treasury notes and bonds. Some evidence suggests the first type reflects increased market segmentation. These results have important implications for the calibration and testing of no-arbitrage term structure models and interpreting tests of the expectations hypothesis.

In this article we generalize Harvey's (1989) empirical specification of conditional asset pricing models to allow for both time‐varying covariances between stock returns and marketwide factors and time‐varying reward‐to‐covariabilities. The model is then applied to examine the effects of firm size and book‐to‐market equity ratios. We find that the traditional asset pricing model with commonly used factors can only explain a small portion of the stock returns predicted by firm size and book‐to‐market equity ratios. The results indicate that allowing time‐varying covariances and time‐varying reward‐to‐covariabilities does little to salvage the traditional asset pricing models.

This work advances a theory of finance and investment under uncertainty and risk aversion which resolves problems left unsolved by Keynes in a manner consistent with his work. Keynes established that both the short-run and long-run performance of a capitalist system depend upon investment, but he failed to arrive at an alternative to the neoclassical theory of investment. Professor Gordon demonstrates that the extension of neoclassical theory to deal with uncertainty and risk aversion is based upon a string of assumptions which are empirically false. The competitive stationary state, the foundation for the neoclassical theory of a capitalist system, is shown to be unfeasible because it results in a very high probability of bankruptcy at the micro level and the system's early collapse on the macro level. Capitalists seeking long term survival are shown to be subject to a growth imperative, to the pursuit of monopoly power, and to a concern for financial policy. Later sections of the book discuss the consequences of this behaviour for short-run fluctuations and the long-run development of capitalist systems. This book advanves a new theory of finance and investment which recognizes the problem of bankruptcy when the future is uncertain. It should be of use to both post-Keynesian and neoclassical economists as a significant contribution to economic understanding.

We explore how wheat spot and futures market volatility has been impacted by government farm programs during the 1950–1993 period. We find that changing volatility in both markets is highly associated with changing farm programs. The mandatory allotment programs of the 1950s and early 1960s (1/3/50–4/10/64) were associated with low volatility, while the voluntary programs initiated in the mid 1960s seem to have induced high volatility (4/11/64–12/22/85). Both market-driven loan rates and conservation reserve programs appear to have helped volatility revert to lower levels since the mid 1980s (12/23/85–12/30/93). We also examine seasonality and causality in conjunction with the farm programs.

The ostensible purpose of the Basle Accord was to standardize bank-capital regulations among the twelve leading industrial countries. Its ulterior goal was to 'level the playing field' by eliminating a funding-cost advantage of Japanese banks that had allowed them to capture more than one-third of international lending. The wealth gain for Japanese bank shareholders was 31.63 percent. Wealth effects for shareholders of non-Japanese banks were not significant. These results suggest that the Baste Accord did not eliminate the pricing advantage of Japanese banks, challenging the non-Japanese regulators' contention that the regulation would help level the playing field.

Plotting daily stock returns against themselves with one day's lag reveals a striking pattern. Evenly spaced lines radiate from the origin; the thickest lines point in the major directions of the compass. This “compass rose” pattern appears in every stock. It is caused by discreteness. However, counter‐examples demonstrate that the existence of exchange‐imposed tick sizes (e.g. eighths) is neither necessary nor sufficient for the compass rose. The compass rose cannot be used to make abnormal profits: it is structure without predictability. Among other consequences, the compass rose may bias estimation of ARCH models, and tests for chaos.

We document a directional asymmetry in the small stock concurrent and lagged response to large stock movements. When returns on large stocks are negative, the concurrent beta for small stocks is high, but the lagged beta is insignificant. When returns on large stocks are positive, small stocks have small concurrent betas and very significant lagged betas. That is, the cross-autocorrelation puzzle documented by Lo and MacKinlay (1990a) is associated with a slow response by some small stocks to good, but not to bad, common news. Time series portfolio tests and cross-sectional tests of the delay for individual securities suggest that existing explanations of the cross-autocorrelation puzzle based on data mismeasurement, minor market imperfections, or time-varying risk premiums fail to capture the directional asymmetry in the data.

A martingale approach is used to characterize general equilibrium in the presence of portfolio insurance. Insurers sell to non-insurers in bad states, and general equilibrium requires that the risk premium rises to induce non-insurers to increase their holdings. We show that portfolio insurance increases price volatility, causes mean reversion in asset returns, raises the Sharpe ratio and volatility in bad states, and causes volatility to be correlated with volume. We also explain why out-of-the-money S&P 500 put options trade at a higher volatility than do in-the-money puts.