Knowledge that Transforms

A weekly database of retail money fund portfolio statistics is uneconomical for retail investors to observe, so it allows direct comparison of disclosed and undisclosed portfolios. This makes possible a more direct and unambiguous test for “window dressing” than elsewhere in the literature. The analysis shows that funds allocating between government and private issues hold more in government issues around disclosures than at other times, consistent with the theory that intermediaries prefer to disclose safer portfolios. Cross‐sectional comparisons locate the most intense rebalancing in the worst recent performers.

We estimate the internal rates of return earned by nonfinancial firms on (i) the initial market values of their securities and (ii) the cost of their investments. The return on value is an estimate of the overall corporate cost of capital. The estimate of the real cost of capital for 1950–96 is 5.95 percent. The real return on cost is larger, 7.38 percent, so on average corporate investment seems to be profitable. A by‐product of calculating these returns is information about the history of corporate earnings, investment, and financing decisions that is perhaps more interesting than the returns.

This paper finds that, on average, targets that terminate takeover offers significantly increase their leverage ratios. Targets that increase their leverage ratios the most reduce capital expenditures, sell assets, reduce employment, increase focus, and realize cash flows and share prices that outperform their benchmarks in the five years following the failed takeover. Our evidence suggests that leverage‐increasing targets act in the interests of shareholders when they terminate takeover offers and that higher leverage helps firms remain independent not because it entrenches managers, but because it commits managers to making the improvements that would be made by potential raiders.

Costs of equity for individual firms are estimated in a Bayesian framework using several factor‐based pricing models. Substantial prior uncertainty about mispricing often produces an estimated cost of equity close to that obtained with mispricing precluded, even for a stock whose average return departs significantly from the pricing model's prediction. Uncertainty about which pricing model to use is less important, on average, than within‐model parameter uncertainty. In the absence of mispricing uncertainty, uncertainty about factor premiums is generally the largest source of overall uncertainty about a firm's cost of equity, although uncertainty about betas is nearly as important.

Derivatives valuation and risk management involve heavy use of quantitative models. To develop a quantitative assessment of model risk as it affects the basic option writing strategy that might be followed by a financial institution, we conduct an empirical simulation, with and without hedging, using data from 1976 to 1996. Results indicate that imperfect models and inaccurate volatility forecasts create sizable risk exposure for option writers. We consider to what extent the damage due to model risk can be limited by pricing options using a higher volatility than the best estimate from historical data.

Merton (1987) proposes that an increase in a firm's investor base increases the firm's value. In Japan, companies can reduce their stock's minimum trading unit—the number of shares in a “round lot”—which facilitates trading in the stock by small investors. We find that a reduction in the minimum trading unit greatly increases a firm's base of individual investors and its stock liquidity, and is associated with a significant increase in the stock price. Further, the stock price appreciation is positively related to an increase in the number of shareholders.

By partitioning quoted depth into the specialist's contribution and the limit order book's contribution, the paper investigates whether specialists manage quoted depth to reduce adverse selection risk. The results show that both specialists and limit order traders reduce depth around information events, thereby reducing their exposure to adverse selection costs. Moreover, specialists' quotes may reflect only the limit order book on the side (or sides) of the market where they believe there is a chance of informed trading. Changes in quoted depth are consistent with specialists managing their inventory as well as having knowledge of the stock's future value.

We examine the volatility‐volume relation in futures markets using volume data categorized by type of trader. We find that the positive volatility‐volume relation is driven by the general public, a group of traders who are distant from the trading floor and therefore without precise information on order flow. Clearing members and floor traders who observe order flow often decrease volatility. Our findings are consistent with Shalen's (1993) hypothesis that uninformed traders who cannot differentiate liquidity demand from fundamental value change increase volatility.

Qualitative choice models of consumers' decisions to file for bankruptcy and their choice of bankruptcy chapter are estimated jointly, combining choice‐based sampling techniques with a nested estimation procedure. Medical and credit card debt are found to be the strongest contributors to bankruptcy, with homeownership playing an important role with respect to both the decision to declare bankruptcy and the choice of bankruptcy alternative. The potential effects of legal changes relating to property exemptions and dischargeable debt categories are found to encourage debt repayment through Chapter 13.

Many theoretical bond pricing models predict that the credit yield curve facing risky bond issuers is downward‐sloping. Previous empirical research (Sarig and Warga (1989), Fons (1994)) supports these models. Our study examines sets of bonds issued by the same firm with equal priority in the liability structure, but with different maturities, thus holding credit quality constant. We find, counter to prior research, that risky bonds typically have upward‐sloping credit yield curves. Moreover, when we combine our matched sets of bonds (no longer controlling credit quality), the estimated slope is negative, indicating a sample selection bias problem associated with maturity.