Knowledge that Transforms

We examine the price discovery process of initial public offerings (IPOs) using a unique dataset. The first quote entered by the lead underwriter in the five‐minute preopening window explains a large proportion of initial returns even for hot IPOs. Significant learning and price discovery continues to take place during these five minutes with hundreds of quotes being entered. The lead underwriter observes the quoting behavior of other market makers, particularly the wholesalers, and accordingly revises his own quotes. There is a strong positive relationship between initial returns and the time of day when trading starts in an IPO.

This paper presents a theory of optimal debt structure when the moral hazard problem is severe. The main idea is that the optimal debt contract delegates monitoring to a single senior lender and that seniority allows the monitoring senior lender to appropriate the full return from his monitoring activities. The theory explains (i) why debt contracts are prioritized, (ii) why short‐term debt is senior to long‐term debt, and (iii) why financial intermediaries usually hold short‐term senior debt whereas long‐term junior debt is widely held. Another implication of the theory is that covenant and maturity structures will be set to conform to the seniority structure.

Using a simple dynamic asset pricing model, this paper investigates the relationship between the precision of public information about economic growth and stock market returns. After fully characterizing expected returns and conditional volatility, I show that (i) higher precision of signals tends to increase the risk premium, (ii) when signals are imprecise the equity premium is bounded above independently of investors' risk aversion, (iii) return volatility is U‐shaped with respect to investors' risk aversion, and (iv) the relationship between conditional expected returns and conditional variance is ambiguous.

We present a simple model implying that futures risk premia depend on both own‐market and cross‐market hedging pressures. Empirical evidence from 20 futures markets, divided into four groups (financial, agricultural, mineral, and currency) indicates that, after controlling for systematic risk, both the futures own hedging pressure and cross‐hedging pressures from within the group significantly affect futures returns. These effects remain significant after controlling for a measure of price pressure. Finally, we show that hedging pressure also contains explanatory power for returns on the underlying asset, as predicted by the model.

This paper outlines and tests two agency models of dividends. According to the “outcome model,” dividends are paid because minority shareholders pressure corporate insiders to disgorge cash. According to the “substitute model,” insiders interested in issuing equity in the future pay dividends to establish a reputation for decent treatment of minority shareholders. The first model predicts that stronger minority shareholder rights should be associated with higher dividend payouts; the second model predicts the opposite. Tests on a cross section of 4,000 companies from 33 countries with different levels of minority shareholder rights support the outcome agency model of dividends.

During the 1980s, U.S. firms announcing stock repurchases earned favorable long‐run returns. Recently, concerns have been raised over the robustness of these findings. This concern comes at a time of explosive growth in repurchase programs. Thus, we study new evidence from the 1990s for 1,060 Canadian repurchase programs. Moreover, because of Canadian law, we can carefully track repurchase activity monthly. Similarly to the situation in the United States, the Canadian stock market discounts the information in repurchase announcements, particularly for value stocks. Completion rates in Canada are sensitive to mispricing. Trades also appear linked to price movements; managers buy more shares when prices fall.

The value premium in U.S. stock returns is robust. The positive relation between average return and book‐to‐market equity is as strong for 1929 to 1963 as for the subsequent period studied in previous papers. A three‐factor risk model explains the value premium better than the hypothesis that the book‐to‐market characteristic is compensated irrespective of risk loadings.

This paper studies Nasdaq market makers' activities during the one and one‐half hour preopening period. Price discovery during the preopening is conducted via price signaling as opposed to the auction used to open the NYSE or the continuous market used during trading. In the absence of trades, Nasdaq dealers use crossed and locked inside quotes to signal to other market makers which direction the price should move. Furthermore, we find evidence of price leadership among market makers that bears little resemblance to their IPO/SEO lead underwriter participation.

Statistical inference in long‐horizon event studies has been hampered by the fact that abnormal returns are neither normally distributed nor independent. This study presents a new approach to inference that overcomes these difficulties and dominates other popular testing methods. I illustrate the use of the methodology by examining the long‐horizon returns of initial public offerings (IPOs). I find that the Fama and French (1993) three‐factor model is inconsistent with the observed long‐horizon price performance of these IPOs, whereas a characteristic‐based model cannot be rejected.