Knowledge that Transforms

Target date funds (TDFs) are designed to provide unsophisticated or inattentive investors with age‐appropriate exposures to different asset classes like stocks and bonds. The rise of TDFs has moved a significant share of retirement investors into macrocontrarian strategies that sell stocks after relatively good stock market performance. This rebalancing drives contrarian flows across equity mutual funds held by TDFs, stabilizing their funding, and reduces stock returns for stocks disproportionately held by these funds when stock market returns are relatively high. Continued growth in TDFs and similar investment products may dampen stock market volatility and increase the transmission of shocks across asset classes.

This paper investigates the performance of option investments across different stocks by computing monthly returns on at‐the‐money straddles on individual equities. We find that options with high historical returns continue to significantly outperform options with low historical returns over horizons ranging from 6 to 36 months. This phenomenon is robust to including out‐of‐the‐money options or delta‐hedging the returns. Unlike stock momentum, option return continuation is not followed by long‐run reversal. Significant returns remain after factor risk adjustment and after controlling for implied volatility and other characteristics. Across stocks, trading costs are unrelated to the magnitude of momentum profits.

Using the dispersion in stock returns during the financial crisis as a source of exogenous variation in the wealth of Norwegian entrepreneurs who held listed stocks, I show that adverse shocks to the wealth of business owners had large effects on their firms' financing, employment, and investment. The effects on investment and employment are driven by young firms, that obtain differentially less bank financing following an owner wealth shock. The effects on employment operate primarily through reduced hiring. My findings highlight that equity‐financing frictions and the procyclicality of entrepreneurial wealth are important channels that can amplify economic shocks.

We consider multiagent multifirm contracting when agents benchmark their wages to those of their peers, using weights that vary within and across firms. When a single principal commits to a public contract, optimal contracts hedge relative wage risk without sacrificing efficiency. But compensation benchmarking undoes performance benchmarking, causing wages to load positively on peer output, and asymmetries in peer effects can be exploited to enhance profits. With multiple principals, a “rat race” emerges: agents are more productive, with effort that can exceed the first best, but higher wages reduce profits and undermine efficiency. Wage transparency and disclosure requirements exacerbate these effects.

We study how a fiscal expansion via infrastructure investment influences the dynamic impacts of monetary stimulus on credit allocation. We develop a two‐stage approach and apply it to the Chinese economy with a confidential loan‐level data set that covers all sectors. We find that infrastructure investment significantly weakened monetary policy's transmission to credit allocated to private firms, while reinforcing the monetary effects on loans to state‐owned firms. This fiscal‐monetary interaction channel is key to understanding the preferential credit access enjoyed by state‐owned firms during the stimulus period. Consequently, monetary stimulus crowded out private investment and decreased capital allocation efficiency.

We present a new approach for estimating small business equity returns. This approach applies the Merton (1974) credit model to the returns on entrepreneurial business credit card debt securitizations and solves for the implied equity returns for the small businesses owned by the cardholders. The estimated small business equity premium is 10.74%. The standard deviation of small business equity returns is 56.37%. We validate the methodology by applying it to investment‐grade corporate bonds and recovering a public equity premium of 6.17%.

We provide causal evidence on the value of asset pledgeability by exploiting a unique feature of Chinese corporate bond markets: bonds with identical fundamentals are traded on two segmented markets with different rules for repo transactions. Using a policy shock that rendered AA+ and AA bonds ineligible for repo on one market only, we compare how bond prices changed across markets and rating classes around this event. When the haircut increases from 0% to 100%, bond yields increase by 39 bps to 85 bps. These estimates help us infer the magnitude of the shadow cost of capital in China.

In recent years, U.S. investment has been lackluster, despite rising valuations. Key explanations include growing rents and growing intangibles. We propose and estimate a framework to quantify their roles. The gap between valuations—reflected in average Q —and investment—reflected in marginal q —can be decomposed into three terms: the value of installed intangibles; rents generated by physical capital; and an interaction term, measuring rents generated by intangibles. The intangible related terms contribute significantly to the gap, particularly in fast‐growing sectors. Our findings suggest care in a pure‐rents interpretation, given the rising role of intangibles.

We study the performance of collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) to understand the market imperfections giving rise to these vehicles and their corresponding economic costs. CLO equity tranches earn positive abnormal returns from the risk‐adjusted price differential between leveraged loans and CLO debt tranches. Debt tranches offer higher returns than similarly rated corporate bonds, making them attractive to banks and insurers that face risk‐based capital requirements. Temporal variation in equity performance highlights the resilience of CLOs to market volatility due to their closed‐end structure, long‐term funding, and embedded options to reinvest principal proceeds.

We develop a tractable model of systemic bank runs. The market‐based banking system features a two‐layer structure: banks with heterogeneous fundamentals face potential runs by their creditors while they trade short‐term funding in the asset (interbank) market in response to creditor withdrawals. The possibility of a run on a particular bank depends on its assets' interim liquidation value, and this value depends endogenously in turn on the status of other banks in the asset market. The within‐bank coordination problem among creditors and the cross‐bank price externality feed into each other. A small shock can be amplified into a systemic crisis.