Knowledge that Transforms

ABSTRACT I examine how media coverage of good and bad corporate news affects stock prices, by studying the effect of investor relations (IR) firms. I find that IR firms “spin” their clients' news, generating more media coverage of positive press releases than negative press releases. This spin increases announcement returns. Around earnings announcements, however, IR firms cannot spin the news and their clients' returns are significantly lower. This pattern is consistent with positive media coverage increasing investor expectations, creating disappointment around hard information. Using reporter connections and geographical links, I argue that IR firms causally affect both media coverage and returns.

ABSTRACT To produce significant net present value, an entrepreneur has to differentiate her enterprise from the ordinary. To take collaborators with her, she needs to have substantial ownership, and thus financing. But it is hard to raise finance against differentiated assets. So an entrepreneur has to commit to undertake a second transformation, standardization, that will make the human capital in the firm, including her own, replaceable, so that outside financiers obtain control rights that will allow them to be repaid. A vibrant stock market helps the entrepreneur commit to these two transformations. The nature of firms and financing are intimately linked.

ABSTRACT We use data over 25 years to understand the life cycle dynamics of VC‐ and non‐VC‐financed firms. We find successful and failed VC‐financed firms achieve larger scale but are not more profitable at exit than matched non‐VC‐financed firms. Cumulative failure rates of VC‐financed firms are lower, with the difference driven largely by lower failure rates in the initial years after receiving VC. Our results are not driven by VCs disguising failures as acquisitions or by certain types of VCs. The performance difference between VC‐ and non‐VC‐financed firms narrows in the post‐internet bubble years, but does not disappear.

ABSTRACT This paper provides evidence of informed trading by individual investors around earnings announcements using a unique data set of NYSE stocks. We show that intense aggregate individual investor buying (selling) predicts large positive (negative) abnormal returns on and after earnings announcement dates. We decompose abnormal returns following the event into information and liquidity provision components, and show that about half of the returns can be attributed to private information. We also find that individuals trade in both return‐contrarian and news‐contrarian manners after earnings announcements. The latter behavior has the potential to slow the adjustment of prices to earnings news.

ABSTRACT Chhaochharia and Grinstein estimate that CEO pay decreases 17% more in firms that were not compliant with the recent NYSE/Nasdaq board independence requirement than in firms that were compliant. We document that 74% of this magnitude is attributable to two outliers of 865 sample firms. In addition, we find that the compensation committee independence requirement increases CEO total pay, particularly in the presence of effective shareholder monitoring. Our evidence casts doubt on the effectiveness of independent directors in constraining CEO pay as suggested by the managerial power hypothesis.

ABSTRACT We use panel data on S&P 1500 companies to identify external network connections between directors and CEOs. We find that firms with more powerful CEOs are more likely to appoint directors with ties to the CEO. Using changes in board composition due to director death and retirement for identification, we find that CEO‐director ties reduce firm value, particularly in the absence of other governance mechanisms to substitute for board oversight. Moreover, firms with more CEO‐director ties engage in more value‐destroying acquisitions. Overall, our results suggest that network ties with the CEO weaken the intensity of board monitoring.

ABSTRACT We study the asset‐pricing implications of technological growth in a model with “small,” disembodied productivity shocks and “large,” infrequent technological innovations, which are embodied into new capital vintages. The technological‐adoption process leads to endogenous cycles in output and asset valuations. This process can help explain stylized asset‐valuation patterns around major technological innovations. More importantly, it can help provide a unified, investment‐based theory for numerous well‐documented facts related to excess‐return predictability. To illustrate the distinguishing features of our theory, we highlight novel implications pertaining to the joint time‐series properties of consumption and excess returns.

ABSTRACT We show that characteristics of stock issuers can be used to forecast important common factors in stocks' returns such as those associated with book‐to‐market, size, and industry. Specifically, we use differences between the attributes of stock issuers and repurchasers to forecast characteristic‐related factor returns. For example, we show that large firms underperform after years when issuing firms are large relative to repurchasing firms. While our strongest results are for portfolios based on book‐to‐market (i.e., HML ), size (i.e., SMB ), and industry, our approach is also useful for forecasting factor returns associated with distress, payout policy, and profitability.

ABSTRACT Rational theories of the closed‐end fund premium puzzle highlight fund share and asset illiquidity, managerial ability, and fees as important determinants of the premium. Several of these attributes are difficult to measure for mutual funds, and easier to measure for hedge funds. This paper employs new data from a secondary market for hedge funds, discovers a closed‐hedge fund premium that is highly correlated with the closed‐end mutual fund premium, and shows that the closed‐hedge fund premium is well explained by variables suggested by rational theories. Sentiment‐based explanations do not find support in the data.

ABSTRACT U.S. exchange‐traded stock options are exercisable before expiration. While put options should frequently be exercised early to earn interest, they are not. In this paper, we derive an early exercise decision rule and then examine actual exercise behavior during the period January 1996 through September 2008. We find that more than 3.96 million puts that should have been exercised early remain unexercised, representing over 3.7% of all outstanding puts. We also find that failure to exercise cost put option holders $1.9 billion in forgone interest income and that this interest is systematically captured by market makers and proprietary firms.