Knowledge that Transforms

With transaction costs for trading goods, the nominal exchange rate moves within a band around the nominal purchasing power parity (PPP) value. We model the behavior of the band and of the exchange rate within the band. The model explains why there are below-unity slope coefficients in regression tests of PPP, and why these increase toward unity under hyperinflation or with low-frequency data. Our results are independent of the presence of nontraded goods in the economy.

This article finds evidence consistent with the hypothesis that managers consider personal risk when making decisions that affect firm risk. I find that Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) with more personal wealth vested in firm equity tend to diversify. CEOs who are specialists at the existing technology tend to buy similar technologies. When specialists have many years vested, they tend to diversify, however. Poor performance in the existing lines of business is associated with movements into new lines of business.

The predictability of an asset's returns will affect the prices of options on that asset, even though predictability is typically induced by the drift, which does not enter the option pricing formula. For discretely-sampled data, predictability is linked to the parameters that do enter the option pricing formula. We construct an adjustment for predictability to the Black-Scholes formula and show that this adjustment can be important even for small levels of predictability, especially for longer maturity options. We propose several continuous-time linear diffusion processes that can capture broader forms of predictability, and provide numerical examples that illustrate their importance for pricing options.

Corporate Restructuring examines the impact of financial restructuring on corporate priorities and performance. Countering the notion that an actual or threatened hostile takeover is needed to induce managers to restructure their firms, Donaldson claims that many companies have successfully restructured voluntarily. Drawing on a series of field studies and close examinations of three companies - General Mills, Burlington Northern, and CPC International - Donaldson shows how firms have implemented radical change through an internal discipline. The factual evidence demonstrates why and how voluntary restructuring works just as well - indeed better - than hostile takeovers, without the trauma of external intervention and disruption to day-to-day operations. Challenging many assumptions of current financial literature on how firms achieve increased efficiency, this book is bound to provoke controversy.

In this paper, we provide evidence concerning the extent to which managers are to blame when their firms become bankrupt. We study a sample of firms that end up in severe financial distress to determine the actions taken by firms' managers as their financial positions worsen. We compare the sample of firms that eventually experience server financial distress (fling for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection) with a control sample of firms that performed better. We suggest that the comparison provides evidence on the way managers act as their firms sink into financial trouble and the extent to which financial distress is the result of incompetence or excessively self-serving managerial decisions or due to factors outside of management's control. We find that managers of Chapter 11 firms and the control forms make very similar decisions and that, on average, neither set of managers are perceived to be taking value- reducing actions. We also find that when managers are replaced in the firms that eventually file for Chapter 11 protection, the market does not respond positively. These findings support the idea that financial distress is due to conditions outside of the control of managers or that the managers are serving as scapegoats.

Within the context of takeovers, this paper shows that in private-value auctions the optimal individually rational strategy for a bidder with partial ownership of the item is to overbid, i.e., to bid more than his valuation. This strategy, however, can lead to i) an inefficient outcome, and ii) the winning bidder making a net loss. Further, the overbidding result implies that the presence of a large shareholder increases the bid premium in single-bidder takeovers at the expense of reducing the probability of the takeover actually occurring.

We analyze the optimal design of debt maturity, coupon payments, and dividend payout restrictions under asymmetric information. We show that, if the asymmetry of information is concentrated around long‐term cash flows, firms finance with coupon‐bearing long‐term debt that partially restricts dividend payments. If the asymmetry of information is concentrated around near‐term cash flows and there exists considerable refinancing risk, firms finance with coupon‐bearing long‐term debt that does not restrict dividend payments. Finally, if the asymmetry of information is uniformly distributed across dates, firms finance with short‐term debt.

Empirical analysis of rates of return in finance implicitly condition on the security surviving into the sample. We investigate the implications of such conditioning on the time series of rates of return. In general this conditioning induces a spurious relationship between observed return and total risk for those securities that survive to be included in the sample. This result has immediate implications for the equity premium puzzle. We show how these results apply to other outstanding problems of empirical finance. Long-term autocorrelation studies focus on the statistical relation between successive holding period returns, where the holding period is of possibly extensive duration. If the equity market survives, then we find that average return in the beginning is higher than average return near the end of the time period. For this reason, statistical measures of long-term dependence are typically biased towards the rejection of a random walk. The result also has implications for event studies. There is a strong association between the magnitude of an earnings announcement and the postannouncement performance of the equity. This might be explained in part as an artefact of the stock price performance of firms in financial distress that survive an earnings announcement. The final example considers stock split studies. In this analysis we implicitly exclude securities whose price on announcement is less than the prior average stock price. We apply our results to this case, and find that the condition that the security forms part of our positive stock split sample suffices to explain the upward trend in event-related cumulated excess return in the preannouncement period.

We analyze a simple model of bank lending in order to ascertain what can be inferred from relative denial and default rates about lending discrimination. We show that if minority applicants are of lower average creditworthiness than majority applicants, then, contrary to a popular argument, a uniform, nondiscriminatory credit policy cannot simultaneously produce (i) higher denial rates for minority applicants, and (ii) equal default rates for minority and majority applicants. Moreover, we show that equality of denial or default rates always implies discrimination. In particular, equal denial (default) rates imply discrimination against majority (minority) applicants.

This article tests a theoretical model of the basis and open interest of stock index futures. The model is based on the differences between stock and futures in terms of investors' ability to customize stock portfolios and liquidity. Empirical evidence confirms the model's prediction that increased volatility decreases the basis and increases open interest.