Knowledge that Transforms

We investigate the relation between dividend changes and future profitability, measured in terms of either future earnings or future abnormal earnings. Supporting “the information content of dividends hypothesis,” we find that dividend changes provide information about the level of profitability in subsequent years, incremental to market and accounting data. We also document that dividend changes are positively related to earnings changes in each of the two years after the dividend change.

Japanese stock returns are even more closely related to their book‐to‐market ratios than are their U.S. counterparts, and thus provide a good setting for testing whether the return premia associated with these characteristics arise because the characteristics are proxies for covariance with priced factors. Our tests, which replicate the Daniel and Titman (1997) tests on a Japanese sample, reject the Fama and French (1993) three‐factor model, but fail to reject the characteristic model.

We investigate the role of limit orders in the liquidity provision in a pure order‐driven market. Results show that market depth rises subsequent to an increase in transitory volatility, and transitory volatility declines subsequent to an increase in market depth. We also examine how transitory volatility affects the mix between limit orders and market orders. When transitory volatility arises from the ask (bid) side, investors will submit more limit sell (buy) orders than market sell (buy) orders. This result is consistent with the existence of limit‐order traders who enter the market and place orders when liquidity is needed.

This paper examines problems in the CRSP Survivor Bias Free U.S. Mutual Fund Database (CRSP, 1998) and compares returns contained in it to those in Morningstar. The CRSP database has an omission bias that has the same effects as survivorship bias. Although all mutual funds are listed in CRSP, return data is missing for many and the characteristics of these funds differ from the populations. The CRSP return data is biased upward and merger months are inaccurately recorded about half the time. Differences in returns in Morningstar and CRSP are a problem for older data and small funds.

Economic distortions can arise when financial claims trade at prices set by an intermediary rather than direct negotiation between principals. We demonstrate the problem in a specific context, the exchange of open‐end mutual fund shares. Mutual funds typically set fund share price (NAV) using an algorithm that fails to account for nonsynchronous trading in the fund's underlying securities. This results in predictable changes in NAV, which lead to exploitable trading opportunities. A modification to the pricing algorithm that corrects for nonsynchronous trading eliminates much of the predictability. However, there are many other potential sources of distortion when intermediaries set prices.

Stocks and other financial assets are traded at prices that lie on a fixed grid determined by the minimum tick size. Observed prices and quoted spreads do not correspond to the equilibrium prices and true spreads that would exist in a market with no minimum tick size. Using Monte Carlo Markov Chain methods, this paper estimates the equilibrium prices and true spreads. For large stocks, most of the quoted spread is attributable to the rounding of prices and the adverse selection component is small. The true spread and the adverse selection component are greater for mid‐sized stocks.

We attempt to translate Neo‐Austrian ideas about the workings of financial markets, as originally advanced by F. A. Hayek, into the standard probabilistic language of modern finance. We focus on an apparent paradox, namely the insistence of Neo‐Austrians on order (i.e., stationarity) together with ever‐reemerging inefficiencies . The paper's findings have implications beyond Neo‐Austrian theory: They demonstrate how easy it is to reject market efficiency, but how much more difficult it is to discern the nature of the inefficiency . We illustrate our findings with price data from the U.S. Treasury bill market over the period 1962 to 1999. There is ample evidence that the price of a three‐month Treasury bill is not a random walk, yet the sign of the average price change is erratic, so that inference about the nature of the inefficiency is unreliable.

In this paper, I use institutional corporate bond trade data to estimate transactions costs in the over‐the‐counter bond market. I find average round‐trip trading costs to be about $0.27 per $100 of par value. Trading costs are lower for larger trades. Small institutions pay more to trade than large institutions, all else being equal. Small bond dealers charge more than large ones. I find no evidence that trading costs more for lower‐rated bonds.

We analyze the information content of the ambient noise level in the Chicago Board of Trade's 30‐year Treasury Bond futures trading pit. Controlling for a variety of other variables, including lagged price changes, trading volumes, and news announcements, we find that the sound level conveys information which is highly economically and statistically significant. Specifically, changes in the sound level forecast changes in the cost of transacting. Following a rise in the sound level, prices become more volatile, depth declines, and information asymmetry increases. Our results offer important implications for the future of open outcry and floor‐based trading mechanisms.