Knowledge that Transforms

We infer motives for trade initiation from market sidedness. We define trading as more two‐sided (one‐sided) if the correlation between the number of buyer‐ and seller‐initiated trades increases (decreases), and assess changes in sidedness (relative to a control sample) around events that identify trade initiators. Consistent with asymmetric information, trading is more one‐sided before merger news. Consistent with belief heterogeneity, trading is more two‐sided before earnings and macro announcements with greater dispersion in analyst forecasts, and after news with larger announcement surprises. We examine the codeterminacy of sidedness, bid‐ask spread, volatility, number of trades, and order imbalance.

This paper tests the cross-sectional implications of “keeping-up-with-the-Joneses” (KUJ) preferences in an international setting. When agents have KUJ preferences, in the presence of undiversifiable nonfinancial wealth, both world and domestic risk (the idiosyncratic component of domestic wealth) are priced, and the equilibrium price of risk of the domestic factor is negative. We use labor income as a proxy for domestic wealth and find empirical support for these predictions. In terms of explaining the cross-section of stock returns and the size of the pricing errors, the model performs better than alternative international asset pricing models.

Why do corporations accumulate liquid assets? We show theoretically that intertemporal trade-offs between interest income taxation and the cost of external finance determine optimal savings. Intriguingly, we find that, controlling for Tobin's q, saving and cash flow are negatively related because firms lower cash reserves to invest after receiving positive cash-flow shocks, and vice versa. Consistent with theory, we estimate negative propensities to save out of cash flow. We also find that income uncertainty affects saving more than do external finance constraints. Therefore, contrary to previous evidence, saving propensities reflect too many forces to be used to measure external finance constraints.

We develop a framework for estimating expected returns—a predictive system—that allows predictors to be imperfectly correlated with the conditional expected return. When predictors are imperfect, the estimated expected return depends on past returns in a manner that hinges on the correlation between unexpected returns and innovations in expected returns. We find empirically that prior beliefs about this correlation, which is most likely negative, substantially affect estimates of expected returns as well as various inferences about predictability, including assessments of a predictor's usefulness. Compared to standard predictive regressions, predictive systems deliver different expected returns with higher estimated precision.

This paper examines trading volume for Nasdaq market makers around analyst recommendation changes issued by an analyst at the same firm. Using Nasdaq PostData, we find a disproportionate increase in market making volume associated with the firm's recommendation changes and evidence of elevated sell volume at the recommending analyst's firm in the 2 days preceding a downgrade. The implications are that the information source matters in determining the placement of trades and that the issuing analyst's firm appears to be rewarded for prereleasing information through increased volume. These findings constitute new evidence of compensation for research production through the market making channel.

Building on a model of corporate investment under collateral constraints, we develop and test a hypothesis on the differential effect of debt capacity on stock returns across financially constrained and unconstrained firms. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find that debt capacity is a significant determinant of stock returns only in the cross‐section of financially constrained firms, after controlling for beta, size, book‐to‐market, leverage, and momentum. The findings suggest that cross‐sectional differences in corporate investment behavior arising from financial constraints, predicted by theories of imperfect capital markets and supported by empirical evidence, are reflected in the stock returns of manufacturing firms.

We report the results of three experiments based on the model of Hong and Stein (1999). Consistent with the model, the results show that when informed traders do not observe prices, uninformed traders generate long-term price reversals by engaging in momentum trade. However, when informed traders also observe prices, uninformed traders generate reversals by engaging in contrarian trading. The results suggest that a dominated information set is sufficient to account for the contrarian behavior observed among individual investors, and that uninformed traders may be responsible for long-term price reversals but play little role in driving short-term momentum.

We provide new evidence on the success of long-run risks in asset pricing by focusing on the risks borne by stockholders. Exploiting microlevel household consumption data, we show that long-run stockholder consumption risk better captures cross-sectional variation in average asset returns than aggregate or nonstockholder consumption risk, and implies more plausible risk aversion estimates. We find that risk aversion around 10 can match observed risk premia for the wealthiest stockholders across sets of test assets that include the 25 Fama and French portfolios, the market portfolio, bond portfolios, and the entire cross-section of stocks.

Standard credit risk models cannot explain the observed clustering of default, sometimes described as “credit contagion.” This paper provides the first empirical analysis of credit contagion via direct counterparty effects. We find that bankruptcy announcements cause negative abnormal equity returns and increases in CDS spreads for creditors. In addition, creditors with large exposures are more likely to suffer from financial distress later. This suggests that counterparty risk is a potential additional channel of credit contagion. Indeed, the fear of counterparty defaults among financial institutions explains the sudden worsening of the credit crisis after the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008.

We provide a comprehensive empirical analysis of the effects of liquidity and information risks on expected returns of Treasury bonds. We focus on the systematic liquidity risk of Pastor and Stambaugh as opposed to the traditional microstructure‐based measures of liquidity. Information risk is measured by the probability of information‐based trading (PIN). We document a strong positive relation between expected Treasury returns and liquidity and information risks, controlling for the effects of other systematic risk factors and bond characteristics. This relation is robust to many empirical specifications and a wide variety of traditional liquidity and informed trading proxies.