Knowledge that Transforms

Scott P. Mason, LYON Taming: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 41, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the America Finance Association, New York, New York, December 28-30, 1985 (Jul., 1986), pp. 576-577

This paper examines the impact of capital structure changes which have no corporate tax consequences. Specifically, exchange offers involving preferred and common stock are analyzed. We find that systematic changes in firm value occur when companies announce preferred-for-common exchange offers. Consequently, we interpret our results to be consistent with a signalling hypothesis. We also find weaker evidence suggesting the existence of agency cost effects or wealth redistributions across security classes. Our findings imply that capital structure changes need not alter the tax status of the issuing firm to affect firm value.

Several observed features of takeover contests appear to be inconsistent with value-maximizing behavior on the part of the agents involved. For instance, managers occasionally resist takeover bids, presumably in order to facilitate competition among bidders. However, counterbids do not always materialize, suggesting that management resistance was not in the best interests of the firm's shareholders. On the other hand, a successful takeover is sometimes accompanied by a decrease in the value of the acquirer's shares. In addition, valuable combinations are occasionally not consummated. We present a simple illustration of sequential takeover bidding in which all managers act in the best interests of their respective shareholders. Within the context of this model, we provide an explanation of the type of behavior described above.

Robert F. Stambaugh, Does the Stock Market Rationally Reflect Fundamental Values?: Discussion, The Journal of Finance, Vol. 41, No. 3, Papers and Proceedings of the Forty-Fourth Annual Meeting of the America Finance Association, New York, New York, December 28-30, 1985 (Jul., 1986), pp. 601-602

In this paper the risks and returns on U.S. banks' foreign currency positions are analyzed in a portfolio setting when both exchange rate and foreign interest rate risks are present. It is shown that U.S. banks could achieve considerable reductions in risk by optimally selecting their foreign currency positions. Actual foreign currency portfolio returns generated from expected exchange rate changes and exchange rate surprises were positive on average but those generated from interest rate surprises were negative. Although the total portfolio returns were positive, on a risk-adjusted basis bank return performance was relatively poor. Nevertheless, despite this relatively poor performance, the risk of ruin or failure for a “representative bank” from foreign currency activities was found to be approximately zero when judged in comparison to the capital funds available to large money center banks to cushion such losses.