Knowledge that Transforms

This paper models the optimal choice of shareholder liability. If investors want managers to be monitored, the monitors should be residual claimants (shareholders), and monitoring and firm value will increase as shareholders commit more of their wealth to the firm. When liquidating wealth is costly, contingent liability dominates direct investment as a wealth commitment device; however, if wealth is unobservable, under this regime only relatively poor investors will hold shares in equilibrium. This may be prevented at a cost by verifying shareholder wealth and restricting stock transfers. Comparative statics on various liability regimes are used to motivate actual contractual arrangements.

This paper investigates the significance of nonlinear contracts on the incentive for portfolio managers to collect information. In addition, the manager must be motivated to disclose this information truthfully. We analyze three contracting regimes: (1) first-best where effort is observable, (2) linear with unobservable effort, and (3) the optimal contract within the Bhattacharya-Pfleiderer quadratic class. We find that the linear contract leads to a serious lack of effort expenditure by the manager. This underinvestment problem can be successfully overcome through the use of quadratic contracts. These contracts are shown to be asymptotically optimal for very risk-tolerant principals.

This paper uses a nonlinear arbitrage-pricing model, a conditional linear model, and an unconditional linear model to price international equities, bonds, and forward currency contracts. Unlike linear models, the nonlinear arbitrage-pricing model requires no restrictions on the payoff space, allowing it to price payoffs of options, forward contracts, and other derivative securities. Only the nonlinear arbitrage-pricing model does an adequate job of explaining the time series behavior of a cross section of international returns.

We investigate, in a two-country general equilibrium model, whether a bias in consumption towards domestic goods will necessarily lead to a preference for domestic securities. We develop a model where investors are constrained to consume only from their domestic capital stock and where it is costly to transfer capital across countries. In this model, investors less risk averse than an investor with log utility bias their portfolios towards domestic assets. Investors more risk averse than log, however, prefer foreign assets. Thus, this model suggests that it is unlikely that the portfolios observed empirically can be explained by the high proportion of domestic goods in total consumption.

Issue size choice and underpricing in mutual‐to‐stock conversions of thrifts are explained as a function of growth opportunities, perquisite consumption, and proprietary information. We provide evidence that thrifts with greater growth opportunities choose larger issue size and experience higher after‐market price appreciation. This finding persists when we allow for investors' inferences about managers' proprietary information. Variables that explain underpricing in typical initial public offerings are significant by themselves but lose significance when combined with the issue size choice variables. Managerial holdings and the offer price do not act as dissipative signals of value in thrift conversions.

We provide evidence that the spread between commodity spot and futures prices (the basis) reflects the macroeconomic risks common to all asset markets. The basis of many commodities is correlated with the stock index dividend yield and corporate bond quality spread. Explanatory power is related to exposure to macroeconomic fluctuations: about 40 percent of the variation in the basis of a portfolio of commodities with high business cycle sensitivity is explained by the stock and bond yields. Further diagnostics indicate that these associations are largely due to the presence of risk premiums, rather than spot price forecasts, in the basis.