This study examines the unit (stock) price and volume behavior of master limited partnerships (MLP) around the ex‐dividend day. Since the dividends of MLPs are not taxable to the unitholder, tax based hypotheses predict no abnormal unit movements around the ex‐day. Significant positive excess returns and volume are found before the ex‐dividend day, and significant negative excess returns are found on the ex‐dividend day. The findings which are not significantly impacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 suggest ex‐day stock movements are not solely a function of investor marginal tax rates or corporate trading behavior.

This study examines the unit (stock) price and volume behavior of master limited partnerships around the ex-dividend day. Since the dividends of master limited partnerships are not taxable to the unitholder, tax-based hypotheses predict no abnormal unit movements around the ex-day. Significant positive excess returns and volume are found before the ex-dividend day, and significant negative excess returns are found on the ex-dividend day. The findings, which are not significantly impacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986, suggest ex-day stock movements are not solely a function of investor marginal tax rates or corporate trading behavior.

Nobel Memorial Prize Lecture for presentation at the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences in Stockholm, December 7, 1990. Helpful comments on an earlier draft were made by my colleagues Steven Kaplan and Robert Vishny.

This study examines the unit (stock) price and volume behavior of master limited partnerships (MLP) around the ex-dividend day. Since the dividends of MLPs are not taxable to the unitholder, tax based hypotheses predict no abnormal unit movements around the ex-day. Significant positive excess returns and volume are found before the ex-dividend day, and significant negative excess returns are found on the ex-dividend day. The findings which are not significantly impacted by the Tax Reform Act of 1986 suggest ex-day stock movements are not solely a function of investor marginal tax rates or corporate trading behavior.

This paper describes a production-based asset pricing model. It is analogous to the standard consumption-based model, but it uses producers and production functions in the place of consumers and utility functions. The model ties stock returns to investment returns (marginal rates of transformation), which are inferred from investment data via a production function. The production-based model is used to examine forecasts of stock returns by business-cycle related variables and the association of stock returns with subsequent economic activity.

The informational role of strategic insider trading around corporate dividend announcements is studied based on the efficient equilibrium in a signaling model with endogenous insider trading. Insider trading immediately prior to the announcement of dividend initiations has significant explanatory power. For firms with insider selling prior to the dividend initiation announcement, the excess returns are negative and significantly lower than for the remaining firms (with no insider trading or just insider buying) as implied by the authors' model. Another implication is that dividend increases may elicit a positive or negative stock price response depending on the firm's investment opportunities.

A simple overlapping generations model is used to characterize the effects of initial margin requirements in the volatility of risky asset prices. Investors are assumed to exhibit heterogenous preferences for risk-bearing, the distribution of which evolves stochastically across generations. This framework is used to show that imposing a binding initial marginal requirement may either increase or decrease stock price volatility, depending upon the microeconomic structure behind fluctuations in economywide average risk-bearing propensity. The ambiguous effect on volatility similarly arises when the source of heterogeneity is noise trader beliefs.

Acquisitions by Japanese corporations are on the rise, a dramatic departure from their traditional aversion to such activity. Loaded with cash, they are formidable players in the new global contest for corporate control. Are the Japanese about to engage in a wave of aggressive corporate takeovers, or are they more likely to act merely as white samurai in battles initiated by others? Will their growing familiarity with the mergers-and-acquisitions business lead to more takeovers inside Japan itself and give Western companies a realistic shot at acquiring a Japanese corporation? By exploring the economic logic underlying business relationships, Japanese Takeovers provides a fresh interpretation of Japanese behavior in the global market. Carl Kester argues there has not been an active market for corporate control in Japan because Japanese companies prefer to build and manage long-term relationships with other firms rather than own those firms' corporate assets. This is true even overseas. Japanese cross-border takeovers have been triggered more by the need to defend valuable business relationships than by their tremendous bidding power. Current trends will further integrate Japan into the global market for corporate control and increase Japanese use of Anglo-American takeover tactics. But successful M&A deal-making with Japanese use of Anglo-American takeover tactics. But successful M&A deal-making with Japanese corporations will hinge more on extensive knowledge of the history and current status of relationships among various stakeholders than on financial acumen. It is imperative that foreigners wishing to be significant players in the Japanese market understand the economic purposebehind the subtle but powerful ties among Japanese corporate stakeholders.