This study examines firm characteristics that lead to shareholder activism and analyzes the effects of activism on target firm governance structure, shareholder wealth, and operating performance for the fifty-one firms targeted by the California Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) over the 1987-93 period. Firm size and level of institutional holdings are found to be positively related to the probability of being targeted, and 72 percent of firms targeted after 1988 adopt proposed changes or make changes resulting in a settlement with CalPERS. Shareholder wealth increases for firms that adopt or settle and decreases for firms that resist. No statistically significant change in operating performance is found.

This study examines firm characteristics that lead to shareholder activism and analyzes the effects of activism on target firm governance structure, shareholder wealth, and operating performance for the 51 firms targeted by CalPERS over the 1987–93 period. Firm size and level of institutional holdings are found to be positively related to the probability of being targeted, and 72 percent of firms targeted after 1988 adopt proposed changes or make changes resulting in a settlement with CalPERS. Shareholder wealth increases for firms that adopt or settle and decreases for firms that resist. No statistically significant change in operating performance is found.

This study examines firm characteristics that lead to shareholder activism and analyzes the effects of activism on target firm governance structure, shareholder wealth, and operating performance for the 51 firms targeted by CalPERS over the 1987–93 period. Firm size and level of institutional holdings are found to be positively related to the probability of being targeted, and 72 percent of firms targeted after 1988 adopt proposed changes or make changes resulting in a settlement with CalPERS. Shareholder wealth increases for firms that adopt or settle and decreases for firms that resist. No statistically significant change in operating performance is found.

A cash‐in‐advance model of a monetary economy is used to derive a money‐based CAPM (M‐CAPM), which allows us to implement tests of asset pricing restrictions without consumption data. A test as in Fama and MacBeth of the model suggests that the money betas have some explanatory power for the cross‐sectional variation of expected returns; however, the model is rejected using conditional information. Consistent with our predictions, estimates of the curvature parameter are lower than those of the consumption CAPM (C‐CAPM) and pricing errors of the M‐CAPM tend to be smaller than those of the C‐CAPM.

A cash-in-advance model of a monetary economy is used to derive a money-based capital asset pricing model (M-CAPM), which allows the authors to implement tests of asset pricing restrictions without consumption data. A test as in Eugene F. Fama and James D. Macbeth (1973) of the model suggests that the money betas have some explanatory power for the cross-sectional variation of expected returns; however, the model is rejected using conditional information. Consistent with their predictions, estimates of the curvature parameter are lower than those of the consumption capital asset pricing model (C-CAPM) and pricing errors of the M-CAPM tend to be smaller than those of the C-CAPM.

A cash-in-advance model of a monetary economy is used to derive a money-based CAPM (M-CAPM), which allows us to implement tests of asset pricing restrictions without consumption data. A test as in Fama and MacBeth of the model suggests that the money betas have some explanatory power for the cross-sectional variation of expected returns; however, the model is rejected using conditional information. Consistent with our predictions, estimates of the curvature parameter are lower than those of the consumption CAPM (C-CAPM) and pricing errors of the M-CAPM tend to be smaller than those of the C-CAPM.