Companies issuing stock during 1970 to 1990, whether an initial public offering or a seasoned equity offering, have been poor long-run investments for investors. During the five years after the issue, investors have received average returns of only 5 percent per year for companies going public and only 7 percent per year for companies conducting a seasoned equity offer. Book-to-market effects account for only a modest portion of the low returns. An investor would have had to invest 44 percent more money in the issuers than in nonissuers of the same size to have the same wealth five years after the offering date.

We propose a measure of capital market integration arising from a conditional regime-switching model. Our measure allows us to describe expected returns in countries that are segmented from world capital markets in one part of the sample and become integrated later in the sample. We find that a number of emerging markets exhibit time-varying integration. Some markets appear more integrated than one might expect based on prior knowledge of investment restrictions. Other markets appear segmented even though foreigners have relatively free access to their capital markets. While there is a perception that world capital markets have become more integrated, our country-specific investigation suggests that this is not always the case.

Approaches to Valuation. Estimation of Discount Rates. Estimation of Cash Flows. Estimation of Growth Rates. Dividend--Discount Models. Free--Cash--Flow--to--Equity Discount Models. Valuing a Firm--The Free--Cash--Flow--to--Firm Approach. Special Cases in Valuation. Price/Earnings Ratios. Price/Book Value Ratios. Price/Sales Ratio. Management Decisions, Corporate Strategy, and Firm Value. Valuation for Acquisitions and Takeovers. Option--Pricing Theory. Applications of Option--Pricing Theory to Valuation. Overview and Conclusion. Appendices. References. Disk Documentation. Index.

We analyze a simple model of bank lending in order to ascertain what can be inferred from relative denial and default rates about lending discrimination. We show that if minority applicants are of lower average creditworthiness than majority applicants, then, contrary to a popular argument, a uniform, nondiscriminatory credit policy cannot simultaneously produce (i) higher denial rates for minority applicants, and (ii) equal default rates for minority and majority applicants. Moreover, we show that equality of denial or default rates always implies discrimination. In particular, equal denial (default) rates imply discrimination against majority (minority) applicants.

We analyze a simple model of bank lending in order to ascertain what can be inferred from relative denial and default rates about lending discrimination. We show that if minority applicants are of lower average creditworthiness than majority applicants, then, contrary to a popular argument, a uniform, nondiscriminatory credit policy cannot simultaneously produce (i) higher denial rates for minority applicants, and (ii) equal default rates for minority and majority applicants. Moreover, we show that equality of denial or default rates always implies discrimination. In particular, equal denial (default) rates imply discrimination against majority (minority) applicants.

The authors analyze a simple model of bank lending in order to ascertain what can be inferred from relative denial and default rates about lending discrimination. They show that if minority applicants are of lower average creditworthiness than majority applicants, then, contrary to a popular argument, a uniform, nondiscriminatory credit policy cannot simultaneously produce higher denial rates for minority applicants and equal default rates for minority and majority applicants. Moreover, the authors show that equality of denial or default rates always implies discrimination. In particular, equal denial (default) rates imply discrimination against majority (minority) applicants.

The authors study whether the behavior of stock prices, in relation to size and book-to-market equity (BE/ME), reflects the behavior of earnings. Consistent with rational pricing, high BE/ME signals persistent poor earnings and low BE/ME signals strong earnings. Moreover, stock prices forecast the reversion of earnings growth observed after firms are ranked on size and BE/ME. Finally, there are market, size, and BE/ME factors in earnings like those in returns. The market and size factors in earnings help explain those in returns but the authors find no link between BE/ME factors in earnings and returns.

We study whether the behavior of stock prices, in relation to size and book to market equity (BE/ME), reflects the behavior of earnings. Consistent with rational pricing, high BE/ME signals persistent poor earnings and low BE/ME signals strong earnings. Moreover, stock prices forecast the reversion of earnings growth observed after firms are ranked on size and BE/ME. Finally, there are market, size, and BE/ME factors in earnings like those in returns. The market and size factors in earnings help explain those in returns, but we find no link between BE/ME factors in earnings and returns.

We study whether the behavior of stock prices, in relation to size and book‐to‐market‐equity (BE/ME), reflects the behavior of earnings. Consistent with rational pricing, high BE/ME signals persistent poor earnings and low BE/ME signals strong earnings. Moreover, stock prices forecast the reversion of earnings growth observed after firms are ranked on size and BE/ME. Finally, there are market, size, and BE/ME factors in earnings like those in returns. The market and size factors in earnings help explain those in returns, but we find no link between BE/ME factors in earnings and returns.

Companies issuing stock during 1970 1990, whether an initial public offering (IPO) or a seasoned equity offering (SEO), have been poor long run investments for investors. During the five years after the issue, investors have received average returns of only 5% per year for companies going public and only 7% per year for companies conducting an SEO. Book to market effects account for only a modest portion of the low returns. An investor would have had to invest 44% more money in the issuers than in non issuers of the same size to have the same wealth five years after the offering date.