ABSTRACT This paper examines whether futures market data can be used to understand the behavior of real interest rates. Several ways of examining the data indicate that futures market data are not particularly informative about real interest rates. Not only does this evidence cast some doubt on results in previous research that make use of futures market data to draw inferences about real interest rates, but it also indicates that future research on real interest rates may need to turn to a different line of attack.

This paper examines whether futures market data can be used to understand the behavior of real interest rates. Several ways of examining the data indicate that futures market data are not particularly informative about real interest rates. No only does this evidence cast some doubt on results in previous research that make use of futures market data to draw inferences about real interest rates, but it also indicates that future research on real interest rates may need to turn to a different line of attack.

This paper develops and empirically tests a two-factor model for pricing financial and real assets contingent on the price of oil. The factors are the spot price of oil and the instantaneous convenience yield. The parameters of the model are estimated using weekly oil futures contract prices from January 1984 to November 1988, and the model's performance is assessed out of sample by valuing futures contracts over the period November 1988 to May 1989. Finally, the model is applied to determine the present values of one barrel of oil deliverable in one to ten years time.

Over the past decade, Sanford Grossman's contributions to the economics of information have significantly altered the way economists think about rational expectations. Here his articles are collected in one place, providing a uniform framework for understanding how prices convey information in securities markets. Grossman elaborates a new model of economic equilibrium that casts a dual role for prices both as constraints that affect the immediate costs or benefits of acts and as conveyers of information about the probable future costs and benefits of those acts. He points to the Wall Street panic of October 1987 as an example of the informational role of prices where volatility actually represented sophisticated trading strategies by relatively uninformed individuals.

ABSTRACT This paper demonstrates how the incentive of manager‐equityholders to substitute toward riskier assets, commonly referred to as the “asset substitution problem,” is related to the level of observable risk in the firm. When observable and unobservable risks are sufficiently positively correlated, increases (decreases) in observable risk generate the incentive for manager‐equityholders to increase (decrease) unobservable risk. Thus, credible commitments to hedge observable risk can benefit the firm's manager‐equityholders by reducing the incentive to shift risk and the associated agency cost of debt. This provides a positive rationale for hedging diversifiable risk at the firm level.

This paper demonstrates how the incentive of manager-equityholders to substitute toward riskier assets, commonly referred to as the “asset substitution problem,” is related to the level of observable risk in the firm. When observable and unobservable risks are sufficiently positively correlated, increases (decreases) in observable risk generate the incentive for manager-equityholders to increase (decrease) unobservable risk. Thus, credible commitments to hedge observable risk can benefit the firm's manager-equityholders by reducing the incentive to shift risk and the associated agency cost of debt. This provides a positive rationale for hedging diversifiable risk at the firm level.

In this paper, the authors examine the profitability of insider trading in firms whose securities trade in the OTC/NASDAQ market. Although the evidence suggests timing and forecasting ability on the part of insiders, high transaction costs (especially bid-ask spreads) appear to eliminate the potential for positive abnormal returns from active trading. By implication, outside investors who mimic the trading of insiders are also precluded from earning abnormal profits. In addition, the authors provide evidence on the determinants of insiders' profits. The data suggest that insiders closer to the firm trade on more valuable information than insiders removed from the firm.

This paper demonstrates how the incentive of manager-equityholders to substitute toward riskier assets, commonly referred to as the "asset substitution problem," is related to the level of observable risk in the firm. When observable and unobservable risks are sufficiently positively correlated, increases (decreases) in observable risk generate the incentive for manager-equityholders to increase (decrease) unobservable risk. Thus, credible commitments to hedge observable risk can benefit the firm's manager-equityholders by reducing the incentive to shift risk and the associated agency cost of debt. This provides a positive rationale for hedging diversifiable risk at the firm level.