We estimate the indirect costs of corporate bankruptcy associated with lost customers. In incentivized experiments, randomly informing consumers about a firm's Chapter 11 reorganization lowers their willingness to pay for the firm's products by 17% to 28%. Consumers worry that bankruptcy could reduce product quality or prevent future interactions with the bankrupt firm. On average, 38% of consumers are aware of major bankruptcies. Using our experiments to estimate a structural model, we show that these indirect costs of bankruptcy amount to 12% to 15% of a firm's value. We show that these costs are unlikely to arise before bankruptcy.

We model the optimal resolution of insolvent firms in general equilibrium. Collateral‐constrained banks lend to (i) solvent firms to finance investments and (ii) distressed firms to avoid liquidation. Liquidations create negative fire‐sale externalities. Liquidations also relieve bank balance–sheet congestion, enabling new firm loans that generate positive collateral externalities by lowering bank borrowing rates. Socially optimal interventions encourage liquidation when firms have high operating losses, high leverage, or low productivity. Surprisingly, larger fire sales promote interventions encouraging more liquidations. We study synergies between insolvency interventions and macroprudential regulation, bailouts, deferred loss recognition, and debt subordination. Our model elucidates historical crisis interventions.