This article investigates the claim that debt finance can increase firm value by curtailing managers' access to 'free cash flow.' The author first shows that incentive contracts that tie the managers' pay to stockholder wealth are often a superior solution to the free cash flow problem. He then considers the possibility that the manager can trade on secondary capital markets. Liquid secondary markets are shown to undermine management incentive schemes and, in many cases, to restore the value of debt finance in controlling the free cash flow problem.

This article evaluates the tax-loss-selling hypothesis against the window-dressing hypothesis as explanations for turn-of-the-year anomalies. The authors examine differences between securities dominated by individual investors versus those dominated by institutional investors and find that the effect is more pervasive in the former. Controlling for capitalization, they find that, in early January (late December), stocks with greater individual investor interest outperform (underperform) stocks with greater institutional investor interest. These results hold for both stocks that previously appreciated in value and stocks that previously depreciated in value. The results are more consistent with the tax-loss-selling hypothesis as an explanation for the turn-of-the-year effect.

This article investigates the claim that debt finance can increase firm value by curtailing managers' access to “free cash flow.” We first show that incentive contracts that tie the managers' pay to stockholder wealth are often a superior solution to the free cash flow problem. We then consider the possibility that the manager can trade on secondary capital markets. Liquid secondary markets are shown to undermine management incentive schemes and, in many cases, to restore the value of debt finance in controlling the free cash flow problem.

This article investigates the claim that debt finance can increase firm value by curtailing managers' access to “free cash flow.” We first show that incentive contracts that tie the managers' pay to stockholder wealth are often a superior solution to the free cash flow problem. We then consider the possibility that the manager can trade on secondary capital markets. Liquid secondary markets are shown to undermine management incentive schemes and, in many cases, to restore the value of debt finance in controlling the free cash flow problem.

The Geske–Johnson approach provides an efficient and intuitively appealing technique for the valuation and hedging of American‐style contingent claims. Here, we generalize their approach to a stochastic interest rate economy. The method is implemented using options exercisable on one of a finite number of dates. We illustrate how the value of an American‐style option increases with interest rate volatility. The magnitude of this effect depends on the extent to which the option is in the money, the volatilities of the underlying asset and the interest rates, as well as the correlation between them.

The Geske–Johnson approach provides an efficient and intuitively appealing technique for the valuation and hedging of American-style contingent claims. Here, we generalize their approach to a stochastic interest rate economy. The method is implemented using options exercisable on one of a finite number of dates. We illustrate how the value of an American-style option increases with interest rate volatility. The magnitude of this effect depends on the extent to which the option is in the money, the volatilities of the underlying asset and the interest rates, as well as the correlation between them.

This study evaluates the tax-loss-selling hypothesis against the window-dressing hypothesis as explanations for the turn-of-the-year return anomalies. We examine differences between securities dominated by individual investors versus those dominated by institutional investors and find that the effect is more pervasive in the former. Controlling for capitalization, we find that in early January, stocks with greater individual investor interest outperform stocks with greater institutional investor interest. These results hold for both stocks that previously appreciated in value and stocks that previously depreciated in value. The results are most consistent with the tax-loss-selling hypothesis as an explanation for the turn-of-the-year effect.

This article evaluates the tax‐loss‐selling hypothesis against the window‐dressing hypothesis as explanations for turn‐of‐the‐year anomalies. We examine differences between securities dominated by individual investors versus those dominated by institutional investors and find that the effect is more pervasive in the former. Controlling for capitalization, we find that in early January (late December), stocks with greater individual investor interest outperform (underperform) stocks with greater institutional investor interest. These results hold for both stocks that previously appreciated in value and stocks that previously depreciated in value. The results are most consistent with the tax‐loss‐selling hypothesis as an explanation for the turn‐of‐the‐year effect.