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Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?

Journal of Finance 1998 53(5), 1775-1798
I test the disposition effect, the tendency of investors to hold losing investments too long and sell winning investments too soon, by analyzing trading records for 10,000 accounts at a large discount brokerage house. These investors demonstrate a strong preference for realizing winners rather than losers. Their behavior does not appear to be motivated by a desire to rebalance portfolios, or to avoid the higher trading costs of low priced stocks. Nor is it justified by subsequent portfolio performance. For taxable investments, it is suboptimal and leads to lower after-tax returns. Tax-motivated selling is most evident in December.

Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders Are Above Average

Journal of Finance 1998 53(6), 1887-1934
People are overconfident. Overconfidence affects financial markets. How depends on who in the market is overconfident and on how information is distributed. This paper examines markets in which price-taking traders, a strategic-trading insider, and risk-averse marketmakers are overconfident. Overconfidence increases expected trading volume, increases market depth, and decreases the expected utility of overconfident traders. Its effect on volatility and price quality depend on who is overconfident. Overconfident traders can cause markets to underreact to the information of rational traders. Markets also underreact to abstract, statistical, and highly relevant information, and they overreact to salient, anecdotal, and less relevant information.

Are Investors Reluctant to Realize Their Losses?

Journal of Finance 1998 53(5), 1775-1798
I test the disposition effect, the tendency of investors to hold losing investments too long and sell winning investments too soon, by analyzing trading records for 10,000 accounts at a large discount brokerage house. These investors demonstrate a strong preference for realizing winners rather than losers. Their behavior does not appear to be motivated by a desire to rebalance portfolios, or to avoid the higher trading costs of low priced stocks. Nor is it justified by subsequent portfolio performance. For taxable investments, it is suboptimal and leads to lower after‐tax returns. Tax‐motivated selling is most evident in December.

Volume, Volatility, Price, and Profit When All Traders Are Above Average

Journal of Finance 1998 53(6), 1887-1934
People are overconfident. Overconfidence affects financial markets. How depends on who in the market is overconfident and on how information is distributed. This paper examines markets in which price‐taking traders, a strategic‐trading insider, and risk‐averse marketmakers are overconfident. Overconfidence increases expected trading volume, increases market depth, and decreases the expected utility of overconfident traders. Its effect on volatility and price quality depend on who is overconfident. Overconfident traders can cause markets to underreact to the information of rational traders. Markets also underreact to abstract, statistical, and highly relevant information, and they overreact to salient, anecdotal, and less relevant information.

Trading Is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock Investment Performance of Individual Investors

Journal of Finance 2000 55(2), 773-806 open access
Individual investors who hold common stocks directly pay a tremendous performance penalty for active trading. Of 66,465 households with accounts at a large discount broker during 1991 to 1996, those that trade most earn an annual return of 11.4 percent, while the market returns 17.9 percent. The average household earns an annual return of 16.4 percent, tilts its common stock investment toward high‐beta, small, value stocks, and turns over 75 percent of its portfolio annually. Overconfidence can explain high trading levels and the resulting poor performance of individual investors. Our central message is that trading is hazardous to your wealth.

Overconfidence, Compensation Contracts, and Capital Budgeting

Journal of Finance 2011 66(5), 1735-1777
A risk‐averse manager's overconfidence makes him less conservative. As a result, it is cheaper for firms to motivate him to pursue valuable risky projects. When compensation endogenously adjusts to reflect outside opportunities, moderate levels of overconfidence lead firms to offer the manager flatter compensation contracts that make him better off. Overconfident managers are also more attractive to firms than their rational counterparts because overconfidence commits them to exert effort to learn about projects. Still, too much overconfidence is detrimental to the manager since it leads him to accept highly convex compensation contracts that expose him to excessive risk.

Attention‐Induced Trading and Returns: Evidence from Robinhood Users

Journal of Finance 2022 77(6), 3141-3190
We study the influence of financial innovation by fintech brokerages on individual investors’ trading and stock prices. Using data from Robinhood, we find that Robinhood investors engage in more attention‐induced trading than other retail investors. For example, Robinhood outages disproportionately reduce trading in high‐attention stocks. While this evidence is consistent with Robinhood attracting relatively inexperienced investors, we show that it is also driven in part by the app's unique features. Consistent with models of attention‐induced trading, intense buying by Robinhood users forecasts negative returns. Average 20‐day abnormal returns are −4.7% for the top stocks purchased each day.

The “Actual Retail Price” of Equity Trades

Journal of Finance 2025 80(5), 2507-2541 open access
We compare execution quality of six brokerage accounts across five brokers by generating a sample of 85,000 simultaneous market orders. Commission levels and payment for order flow (PFOF) differ across our accounts. We find that execution prices vary significantly across brokers: the mean account‐level round‐trip cost ranges from 0.07% to 0.46%, excluding any commissions. The dispersion is due to off‐exchange wholesalers systematically giving different execution prices for the same trades to different brokers. Across brokers, variation in PFOF does not explain the large variation in price execution. We provide several suggestions for more informative disclosures on execution quality.

A (Sub)penny for Your Thoughts: Tracking Retail Investor Activity in TAQ

Journal of Finance 2024 79(4), 2403-2427 open access
We placed 85,000 retail trades in six retail brokerage accounts from December 2021 to June 2022 to validate the Boehmer et al. algorithm, which uses subpenny trade prices to identify and sign retail trades. The algorithm identifies 35% of our trades as retail, incorrectly signs 28% of identified trades, and yields uninformative order imbalance measures for 30% of stocks. We modify the algorithm by signing trades using the quoted spread midpoints. The quote midpoint method does not affect identification rates but reduces the signing error rates to 5% and provides informative order imbalance measures for all stocks.