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Gig labor: Trading safety nets for steering wheels

Journal of Financial Economics 2025 163, 103956
Using administrative data on credit profiles matched with unemployment insurance (UI) for individuals in the U.S., we show that laid-off workers with access to Uber rely less on household debt, experience fewer delinquencies, and are less likely to apply for UI benefits. Our empirical strategy exploits both the staggered market entry of Uber across cities and the differential benefit of its entry across car owners based on car age, a key eligibility requirement of the platform. We conclude that the introduction of Uber reduced reliance on these alternative means of smoothing extreme income shocks.

Shareholder democracy in play: Career consequences of proxy contests

Journal of Financial Economics 2014 114(2), 316-340
This paper shows that proxy contests have a significant adverse effect on careers of incumbent directors. Following a proxy contest, directors experience a significant decline in the number of directorships not only in the targeted company, but also in other nontargeted companies. The results are established using the universe of all proxy contests during 1996–2010. To isolate the effect of the proxy contest, our empirical strategy uses within-firm variation in directors׳ exposure to the possibility of being voted out and exploits the predetermined schedule of staggered boards that allows only a fraction of directors to be nominated for election every year. We find that nominated directors relative to non-nominated ones lose 58% more seats on other boards. The evidence suggests the proxy-contest mechanism imposes a significant career cost on incumbent directors.

The real effects of share repurchases

Journal of Financial Economics 2016 119(1), 168-185
We employ a regression discontinuity design to identify the real effects of share repurchases on other firm outcomes. The probability of share repurchases that increase earnings per share (EPS) is sharply higher for firms that would have just missed the EPS forecast in the absence of the repurchase, when compared with firms that “just beat” the EPS forecast. We use this discontinuity to show that EPS-motivated repurchases are associated with reductions in employment and investment, and a decrease in cash holdings. Our evidence suggests that managers are willing to trade off investments and employment for stock repurchases that allow them to meet analyst EPS forecasts.