Evidence presented here indicates that the relationship between stock returns and unexpected inflation differs systematically across firms. The differences are shown to be consistent with cross-sectional variation in firms' nominal contracts (monetary claims and depreciation tax shields). The differences are also partially explained by proxies for underlying firm characteristics that could create interaction between unexpected inflation and operating profitability. Finally, much if not most of the differences appear to arise because unexpected inflation is correlated with changes in expected aggregate real activity, the effects of which tend to vary across firms according to their systematic risk.

Since prices are constrained to discrete tick multiples while dividends are essentially continuous, ex day price changes will not equal dividends. We argue that the expected price drop is strictly less than the dividend but within one tick of the dividend. The price-drop-to-dividend ratio will (i) be less than one, (ii) increase with dividends generally, and (iii) decline between tick multiples, giving a sawtooth pattern in the data. Since dividends and dividend yields are highly correlated, discreteness will give the impression of tax-induced dividend clienteles even if there are none. Taxable cash dividends and nontaxable stock dividends exhibit similar ex day behavior.

This paper examines the wealth impact of share repurchases that restrict participation to a particular sub-set of a firm's stockholders. Repurchases at a premium from insiders and small shareholders increase the wealth of non-participating stockholders and are therefore consistent with the shareholders' interest hypothesis. However, privately negotiated repurchases of single blocks from stockholders unaffiliated with the firm reduce the wealth of non-participating stockholders. In contrast to the evidence for general repurchases, no positive wealth effect offsets the significant repurchase premium paid to the selling stockholder. Indeed, the wealth loss to non-participating stockholders is significantly greater than the premium paid. This evidence is inconsistent with the shareholders' interest hypothesis and supports the hypothesis that managers in their self-interest use single block repurchases to eliminate threats to their control over the firm's resources.

This paper presents a parsimonious, structural model that isolates primary economic determinants of the level and dispersion of managerial ownership, firm scale, and performance and the empirical associations among them. In particular, variation across firms and through time of estimated productivity parameters for physical assets and managerial input and corresponding variation in optimal compensation contract and firm size combine to deliver the well-known hump-shaped relation between Tobin's Q and managerial ownership. To assess the effectiveness of standard econometric approaches to the endogeneity problem, we apply those remedies to panel data generated from the model. The unfortunate conclusion is that, at least in the ownership–performance context, proxy variables, fixed effects, and instrumental variables do not generally provide reliable solutions to simultaneity bias.

The interaction between an investment bank's research and market making arms may have important implications for the trading of a firm's stock. We investigate the impact that research has on the liquidity provided by the bank's market maker. Utilizing a large sample of Nasdaq firms, we show that market makers whose banks also provide research coverage provide more liquidity and contribute more to price discovery than do market makers without such research coverage. Finally, we show that such “affiliated” market makers are less affected by uncertainty following earnings announcements. Our results provide new evidence on the sources of liquidity improvements for Nasdaq firms, and suggest that the information produced by banks in the sell-side research process is beneficial to their market makers.

This paper examines whether a party to a strategic alliance or joint venture suffers from spillover effects when the other partner files for bankruptcy. We find that the non-bankrupt strategic alliance partners, on average, experience a negative stock price reaction around their partner firm's bankruptcy filing announcement. This negative effect is strongest for longer partnerships and those with higher returns at the announcement of the initial alliance formation. Furthermore, horizontal alliance firms in declining industries have lower returns, indicating that industry conditions can exacerbate expected problems for the non-bankrupt firm. Non-bankrupt partners also experience drops in profit margins and investment levels in the subsequent two years with the worst performance concentrated among the longer-term agreements. There is very little impact on the returns or performance for joint venture partners, which suggests that these agreements are more insulating for the partner firm.

We use slow and fast time-series momentum to characterize four stock market cycles—Bull, Correction, Bear, and Rebound. The steep market declines of Bears concentrate in high-risk states, yet predict negative expected returns, which is difficult to rationalize by most models of time-varying risk premia. Using a model to analyze slow and fast momentum strategies, we estimate both relatively high mean persistence and realization noise in U.S. stock market returns. Intermediate-speed momentum portfolios, formed by blending slow and fast momentum strategies, translate predictive information in market cycles into positive unconditional alpha, for which we propose a novel decomposition.

We measure the impact of reputation for proxy fighting on investor activism by estimating a dynamic model in which activists engage a sequence of target firms. Our estimation produces an evolving reputation measure for each activist and quantifies its impact on campaign frequency and outcomes. We find that high reputation activists initiate 3.5 times as many campaigns and extract 85% more settlements from targets, and that reputation-building incentives explain 20% of campaign initiations and 19% of proxy fights. Our estimates indicate these reputation effects combine to nearly double the value that activism adds for target shareholders.

This paper investigates whether investor-level taxes affect corporate payout policy decisions. We predict and find a surge of special dividends in the final months of 2010 and 2012, immediately before individual-level dividend tax rates were expected to increase. We also find evidence that immediately before the expected tax increases, firms altered the timing of their regular dividend payments by shifting what would normally be January regular dividend payments into the preceding December. To our knowledge this is the first evidence in the literature about changes in the timing of regular dividend payments in response to tax law changes. For both actions (specials and shifting), we find that it was more likely for a firm to respond to individual-level tax rates if insiders owned a relatively large amount of the firm. Overall, our paper provides evidence that managers consider individual-level taxes in making corporate payout decisions.

This paper provides evidence on a previously unidentified source of managerial incentives: concerns about post-retirement board service. Both the likelihood that a retired CEO serves on his own board two years after departure, as well as the likelihood of serving as an outside director on other boards, are positively and strongly related to his performance while CEO. Retention on the CEO's own board depends primarily on stock returns, while service on outside boards is better explained by accounting returns. The evidence also suggests that firms consider ability in choosing board members.