Knowledge that Transforms

The mean return for stocks is positive only for days immediately before and during the first half of calendar months, and indistinguishable from zero for days during the last half of the month. This ‘monthly effect’ is independent of other known calendar anomalies such as the January effect documented by others and appears to be caused by a shift in the mean of the distribution of returns from days in the first half of the month relative to days in the last half.

The essence of corporate control includes the hiring and firing of key managers. We examine changes in equity values when the Board of Directors appoints and dismisses top-level managers. The evidence suggests that management changes signal shifts in company policy and raise shareholder wealth, internal promotions confirm the soundness of investment by large companies in firm-specific human capital while external appointments do not, promotions occur more often than external appointments but decline in importance as firm size decreases, and dismissal is not a favored means to handle managerial underperformance but is associated with stock price increases when used.

This paper hypothesizes that the relation between stock returns and inflation is caused by the equilibrium process in the monetary sector. More importantly, these relations vary over time in a systematic manner depending on the influence of money demand and supply factors. Post-war evidence from the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and Germany indicates that the negative stock return-inflation relations are caused by money demand and counter-cyclical money supply effects. On the other hand, pro-cyclical movements in money, inflation, and stock prices during the 1930's lead to relations which are either positive or insignificant.

In monthly U.S. data for 1959–1979 and 1979–1983, the state of the term structure of interest rates predicts excess stock returns, as well as excess returns on bills and bonds. This paper documents this fact and uses it to examine some simple asset pricing models. In 1959–1979, the data strongly reject a single-latent-variable specification of predictable excess returns. There is considerable evidence that conditional variances of excess returns change through time, but the relationship between conditional mean and conditional variance is reliably positive only at the short end of the term structure.

This paper examines possible motives for and consequences of voluntary corporate liquidations. Specifically, the procedural and tax differences between voluntary liquidations and other control-changing transaction devices are analyzed. An empirical investigation of successful liquidations shows that the announcement of liquidation reduces the risk of liquidating shares, that the shareholders receive substantial gains from successful liquidations, and that the average gains to the acquiring shareholders are not significantly different from zero. These findings suggest that the liquidating firms' assets have been underutilized before liquidation and that voluntary liquidations lead to higher-valued reallocations of corporate resources.

This paper examines the relation between stock returns and stock market volatility. We find evidence that the expected market risk premium (the expected return on a stock portfolio minus the Treasury bill yield) is positively related to the predictable volatility of stock returns. There is also evidence that unexpected stock market returns are negatively related to the unexpected change in the volatility of stock returns. This negative relation provides indirect evidence of a positive relation between expected risk premiums and volatility.

This paper presents evidence regarding the two quantifiable components of the costs of going public: direct expenses and underpricing. Together, these costs average 21.22% of the realized market value of the securities issued for firm commitment offers and 31.87% for best efforts offers. For a given size offer, the direct expenses are of the same order of magnitude for both contract types, but the underpricing is greater for best efforts offers. An explanation of why some firms choose to use best efforts offers in spite of their apparent higher total costs is given.