Knowledge that Transforms

I investigate cross-sectional variation in stock returns over the trading day and overnight to shed light on what drives asset pricing anomalies. Margin requirements are higher overnight, and lending fees are typically charged only on positions held overnight. Such institutional constraints and overnight risk incentivize arbitrageurs who trade on mispricing to reduce their positions before the end of the day. Consistent with this intuition, a mispricing factor earns positive returns throughout the day but performs poorly at the end of the day. This pattern strengthens in the second half of the sample and is shared by several well-known anomalies.

Banks’ funding sources have changed significantly during the last two decades. The share of non-core funding (NCF) was high before the 2008 crisis but declined substantially after the crisis. We propose a general equilibrium model where NCF provides insurance against idiosyncratic risks faced by banks. Insurance makes leverage and investment more attractive, but it also increases the vulnerability of the banking sector to crises. We show that learning about the likelihood of a crisis could have been important for generating the observed dynamics of NCF and leverage, which in turn affected the dynamics of the macro-economy.

What makes an asset institutional quality? This paper proposes that one reason is the existing concentration of delegated investors in a market through a liquidity channel. Consistent with this intuition, it documents differences in investor composition across US cities and shows that delegated investors concentrate their investments in cities with higher turnover. It then estimates a search model showing how heterogeneity in liquidity preferences makes some markets more liquid, even when assets have identical cash flows. The paper provides evidence for clientele equilibria arising in frictional asset markets and suggests that a liquidity channel may explain divergent paths in city development.

We examine listing applications by firms to the London Stock Exchange between 1891 and 1911. The exchange rejected 82 (13.1%) of the 628 applicants to its main board. Accepted applicants were twice as likely to pay dividends (and to pay twice as much) and had longer firm lives than rejected applicants. Rejected applicants were more likely to file for liquidation than successful applicants. These results remain even after we control for the primary benefits of the listing itself: liquidity and future capital inflows. In this era, the London Stock Exchange could screen applicants for listing.

We propose an approach to identify economic shocks (monetary, growth, and risk premium news) from stock returns and Treasury yield changes, which allows us to study the drivers of asset prices at a daily frequency since the early 1980s. We apply the identification to examine investors’ responses to news from the Fed and key macro announcements. We uncover two risk premium shocks—time-varying compensation for discount rate and cash flow news—which have distinct effects on stocks and bonds. Since the mid-1990s, the Fed-induced reductions in both risk premium sources have generated high average stock returns but an ambiguous response in bonds on FOMC days.

Management companies assign some portfolio managers to run funds within a single investment objective (i.e., specialists), and others to run funds across several investment objectives (i.e., generalists). Our results show that funds achieve higher performance when they appoint superior pickers as specialists and market timers as generalists. We argue that these decisions are the result of a better match of manager mandates with the way information is collected and processed in each investment strategy. Overall our results are consistent with decision-making in fund families that add value to their investors by aiming to optimally assign or reassign portfolio managers.

In this paper, we argue that monetary policy in the form of central bank communication can shape long-term interest rates by changing risk premia. Using high-frequency movements of default-free rates and equity, we show that monetary policy communications by the European Central Bank on regular announcement days led to a significant yield spread between peripheral and core countries during the European sovereign debt crisis by increasing credit risk premia. We also show that central bank communication has a powerful impact on the yield curve outside regular monetary policy days. We interpret these findings through the lens of a model linking information embedded in central bank communication to sovereign yields.

Better access to reproductive healthcare increases women’s propensity to become entrepreneurs. Access correlates positively with female entrepreneurial activity and negatively with female entrepreneurial age. Examining firm size and personal income suggests it also improves the success of female-led businesses. None of these results hold when tested on men, women above 40, or other placebo professions. To establish causality, I exploit Roe v. Wade, state laws restricting abortion providers, and an index tracking state-level regulation of reproductive care. All three analyses suggest that policies securing better reproductive care enable more women to become entrepreneurs. I conclude by discussing various possible channels and mechanisms.

I study how firms deal with business regulations that limit their operations. I first show that the ownership structure of a firm affects its degree of compliance with regulations, with publicly listed firms complying more than privately held ones. This differential compliance imposes a burden on listed firms that helps explain mergers and acquisitions patterns. When regulatory levels increase, private firms acquire listed ones and listed firms stop acquiring private ones. These results uncover an additional cost faced by listed companies, identify a new driver of M&A transactions, and show that high levels of regulation lead to opaque corporate structures.

We provide direct evidence that governments selectively default on debt when they can identify creditors. Analyzing a comprehensive data set of subnational debt, we show that Chinese local governments choose to default on banks with weaker political power. A reduction in a bank's political power relative to other banks increases the likelihood of selective default by local governments. Such default selections are driven by banks’ influence over politician promotion. When local politicians are highly ranked or connected to national leaders, they engage less in selective default as their promotion is less affected by bank loan defaults. Our findings suggest a politics-finance nexus through which government defaults are restrained.