Knowledge that Transforms

We examine the ability of ratings and market-based measures to predict defaults. Although market-based measures are more accurate at horizons up to one year, ratings complement market-based measures and are not redundant in predicting defaults across horizons. Market-based measures differ from ratings in that they respond to both cash-flow and discount-rate news, while ratings respond primarily to cash-flow news, which is more informative of future defaults. Ratings ignore transitory shocks to credit risk, while market-based measures do not. Rating agencies respond to transitory shocks with watches rather than downgrades. Ratings are more informative during expansions and for speculative grade firms.

We identify a group of “suspicious” firms that use stock splits, perhaps along with other activities, to artificially inflate their share prices. Following the initiation of suspicious splits, share prices temporarily increase, and subsequently decline below their presplit levels. Using account level data, we find that small retail investors acquire shares in firms initiating suspicious splits, while more sophisticated investors accumulate positions before suspicious split announcements and sell in the postsplit period. We also find that insiders sell large blocks of shares and obtain loans using company stock as collateral around the initiation of suspicious splits.

Motivated by the extremely low level of the CBOE VIX accompanied by the high level of U.S. economic policy uncertainty in the period of late 2016 to the end of 2017, we examine the factors affecting the relationship between market volatility and economic policy uncertainty in the United States and the United Kingdom. Our analysis shows that low-quality political signals, higher opinion divergence among investors, and exceptional equity market performance consistently weaken the positive relationship between implied market volatility and policy uncertainty. Our findings help to explain the divergence between the market volatility index and economic policy uncertainty post the 2016 U.S. presidential election and the UK Brexit referendum.

Green assets delivered high returns in recent years. This performance reflects unexpectedly strong increases in environmental concerns, not high expected returns. German green bonds outperformed their higher-yielding non-green twins as the “greenium” widened, and U.S. green stocks outperformed brown as climate concerns strengthened. Despite that outperformance, we estimate lower expected returns for green stocks than for brown, consistent with theory. We estimate expected returns in two ways: ex ante, using implied costs of capital, and ex post, using realized returns purged of shocks from climate concerns and earnings. A theoretically motivated green factor explains much of value stocks’ recent underperformance.

The decline of the U.S. manufacturing share since 1960 has occurred disproportionately during recessions. Using evidence from two natural experiments—the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and U.S. interstate banking deregulation in the 1980s—I find a role for credit reallocation in explaining this phenomenon by showing that losing access to credit disproportionately hurt manufacturing firms, and that the creation of new credit disproportionately benefited nonmanufacturing firms. These results arise endogenously from a model with technology-driven structural change and fixed costs of establishing new financial relationships. The model suggests an important role for long-run industry trajectories in properly accounting for the costs and benefits of policy interventions in credit markets.

Measures of US government policy approval are strongly related to persistent fluctuations in the dollar value. Contemporaneous correlations between approval ratings and the dollar approach 50% against advanced economy currencies. High approval ratings further forecast a decline in the dollar risk premium several years ahead and are associated with a persistent increase in economic growth and a reduction in economic volatility. We provide an illustrative model to interpret our empirical evidence. In the model, policy valuations (approvals) are forward-looking and increase at times of high expected policy-related growth and low policy-related uncertainty, which are times of a strong dollar and low dollar risk premium.

We find large overnight returns with no abnormal variance before nonfarm payrolls, ISM, and GDP announcements, similar to the pre-FOMC returns. To explain this common pattern, we propose a two-risk model with the uncertainty about the magnitude of the impending news’ market impact as an additional risk, and link the pre-announcement return directly to the accumulation of heightened uncertainty and its later resolution prior to the announcement. We empirically test and verify the model’s distinct predictions on the joint intertemporal behavior of return, variance, and particularly VIX – a gauge of impact uncertainty by our model, surrounding macroeconomic announcements.

We characterize the distribution of long-term equity returns based on the historical record of stock market performance in a broad cross section of 39 developed countries over the period from 1841 to 2019. Our comprehensive sample mitigates concerns over survivor and easy data biases that plague other work in this area. A bootstrap simulation analysis implies substantial uncertainty about long-horizon stock market outcomes, and we estimate a 12% chance that a diversified investor with a 30-year investment horizon will lose relative to inflation. The results contradict the conventional advice that stocks are safe investments over long holding periods.

Fund trades and stock prices vary systematically with the quarterly reporting cycle. Funds accelerate trades that complete the building of existing positions at quarter-end but delay trades that initiate the building of new positions until the start of the new quarter. Evidence suggests these trade dynamics are driven by a dual desire to make disclosures more informative about future holdings but avoid disclosing incomplete positions. Consistent with disclosure-based motives unrelated to new information about intrinsic values driving these quarterly trade dynamics, both stock price informativeness and commissions paid by funds drop at quarter-end.

Sentiment should exhibit its strongest effects on asset prices at times when valuations are most subjective. Accordingly, we show that a one-standard-deviation increase in aggregate uncertainty amplifies the predictive ability of sentiment for market returns by two to four times relative to when uncertainty is at its mean. For the cross-section of returns, the predictive ability of sentiment for assets expected to be most sensitive to sentiment, including existing measures of both risk and mispricing, is substantially larger in times of higher uncertainty. The results hold for both daily and monthly proxies for sentiment and for various proxies for uncertainty.