Knowledge that Transforms

We present a simple model that rationalizes performance persistence in hedge fund limited partnerships. In contrast to the model for mutual funds of Berk and Green (2004), the learning in our model pertains to profitability associated with an innovative trading strategy or emerging sector, rather than ability specific to the fund manager. As a result of potential information spillovers, which would increase competition if informed investors were to partner with non-incumbent managers, incumbent managers will let informed investors benefit from increases in estimated profitability following high returns realized with the trading strategy or in the sector.

We examine the effect of directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) on the outcomes of merger and acquisition (M&A) decisions. We find that acquirers whose executives have a higher level of D&O insurance coverage experience significantly lower announcement-period abnormal stock returns. Further analyses suggest that acquirers with a higher level of D&O insurance protection tend to pay higher acquisition premiums and their acquisitions appear to exhibit lower synergies. The evidence provides support for the notion that the provision of D&O insurance can induce unintended moral hazard by shielding directors and officers from the discipline of shareholder litigation.

Within the standard search and matching model, time-to-build implies that high aggregate risk premiums should forecast low employment growth in the short run but high employment growth in the long run. If there is also time-to-plan, high risk premiums should forecast low net hiring rates in the short run but high net hiring rates in the long run. Our evidence indicates two-quarter time-to-build in the aggregate payroll data, no time-to-plan in the aggregate hiring data, but two-quarter time-to-plan in the job creation data for manufacturing firms. High payroll growth and high net job creation rate in manufacturing also forecast low stock market excess returns at business cycle frequencies.

This study identifies how country differences on a key cultural dimension—egalitarianism—influence international investment flows. A society's cultural orientation toward egalitarianism is manifested by intolerance for abuses of market and political power and a desire for protecting less powerful actors. We show egalitarianism to be based on exogenous factors including social fractionalization, dominant religion circa 1900, and war experience from the 19th century. We find a robust influence of egalitarianism distance on cross-national flows of bond and equity issuances, syndicated loans, and mergers and acquisitions. An informal cultural institution largely determined a century or more ago, egalitarianism exercises its effect on international investment via an associated set of consistent contemporary policy choices. But even after controlling for these associated policy choices, egalitarianism continues to exercise a direct effect on cross-border investment flows, likely through its direct influence on managers' daily business conduct.

We find that left-wing voters and politicians are less likely to invest in stocks, controlling for income, wealth, education, and other relevant factors. This finding from unique data sets in Finland is robust both at the zip code and at the individual level. A moderate left voter is 17–20% less likely to own stocks than a moderate right voter. The results are consistent with the idea that personal values are a factor in important investment decisions, in this case leading to “stock market aversion.” The results are inconsistent with alternative explanations such as wealth effects, risk aversion, reverse causality, return expectations, or social capital.

We examine whether institutional investors affect corporate governance by analyzing portfolio holdings of institutions in companies from 23 countries during the period 2003–2008. We find that firm-level governance is positively associated with international institutional investment. Changes in institutional ownership over time positively affect subsequent changes in firm-level governance, but the opposite is not true. Foreign institutions and institutions from countries with strong shareholder protection play a role in promoting governance improvements outside of the U.S. Institutional investors affect not only which corporate governance mechanisms are in place, but also outcomes. Firms with higher institutional ownership are more likely to terminate poorly performing Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and exhibit improvements in valuation over time. Our results suggest that international portfolio investment by institutional investors promotes good corporate governance practices around the world.

This paper investigates fire sales of downgraded corporate bonds induced by regulatory constraints imposed on insurance companies. As insurance companies hold over one-third of investment-grade corporate bonds, the collective need to divest downgraded issues may be limited by a scarcity of counterparties. Using insurance company transaction data, we find that insurance companies that are relatively more constrained by regulation are more likely to sell downgraded bonds. Bonds subject to a high probability of regulatory-induced selling exhibit price declines and subsequent reversals. These price effects appear larger during periods when the insurance industry is relatively distressed and other potential buyers' carpital is scarce.

This study investigates whether geographic variation in religion-induced gambling norms affects aggregate market outcomes. We conjecture that gambling propensity would be stronger in regions with higher concentrations of Catholics relative to Protestants. Consistent with our conjecture, we show that in regions with higher Catholic–Protestant ratios, investors exhibit a stronger propensity to hold lottery-type stocks, broad-based employee stock option plans are more popular, the initial day return following an initial public offering is higher, and the magnitude of the negative lottery-stock premium is larger. Collectively, these results indicate that religion-induced gambling attitudes impact investors' portfolio choices, corporate decisions, and stock returns.

We show that uncertainty about parameters of the short rate model can account for the rejections of the expectations hypothesis for the term structure of interest rates. We assume that agents employ Bayes rule to learn parameter values in the context of a model that is subject to stochastic structural breaks. We show that parameter uncertainty also implies that the verdict on the expectations hypothesis varies systematically with the term of the long bond and the particular test employed, in the same way that is found in empirical tests.

We develop a new rationale for initial public offering (IPO) waves based on product market considerations. Two firms, with differing productivity levels, compete in an industry with a significant probability of a positive productivity shock. Going public, though costly, not only allows a firm to raise external capital cheaply, but also enables it to grab market share from its private competitors. We solve for the decision of each firm to go public versus remain private, and the optimal timing of going public. In equilibrium, even firms with sufficient internal capital to fund their new investment may go public, driven by the possibility of their product market competitors going public. IPO waves may arise in equilibrium even in industries which do not experience a productivity shock. Our model predicts that firms going public during an IPO wave will have lower productivity and post-IPO profitability but larger cash holdings than those going public off the wave; it makes similar predictions for firms going public later versus earlier in an IPO wave. We empirically test and find support for these predictions.