Using proprietary audit trail transaction data compiled by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, we investigate at the individual trader level (1) the timing and (2) the determinants of dual traders’ personal trades. Our analysis reveals an absence of any trade timing by dual traders in relation to the execution of their customers’ orders. Further examination employing correlation statistics and time series regressions provides strong support for the proposition that dual traders supply liquidity and actively manage inventory. Even after simultaneously controlling for factors representing information, liquidity supply, and inventory control, within a multivariate regression framework, liquidity supply and inventory control remain as the determinants of dual traders’ personal trades. Overall, the emergent profile of a dual trader is that of an uninformed trader performing complimentary tasks.

We examine the extent to which institutional investors herd in the U.S. corporate bond market and the price impact of their herding behavior. We find that the level of institutional herding in corporate bonds is substantially higher than what is documented for equities, and that sell herding is much stronger and more persistent than buy herding. The price impact of herding is also highly asymmetric. While buy herding facilitates price discovery, sell herding causes transitory yet large price distortions. Such price destabilizing effect of sell herding is particularly pronounced for speculative-grade, small, and illiquid bonds, and during the financial crisis.

We examine synergies in mergers and acquisitions (M&As) generated by firms’ comparative advantages in access to bank finance. We find robust evidence that greater access to bank finance increases firms’ attractiveness as acquisition targets. Targets’ comparative advantage in bank finance improves bank credit supply and reduces financing costs for the merged firms. These effects are more pronounced for acquirers with greater frictions in accessing bank loans and acquirers with greater growth opportunities. Overall, this paper reveals that targets, not just acquirers, contribute to financial synergies in M&As.

To prevent issuers from inflating their share prices, SEC Rule 10b-18 sets price ceilings on share repurchases through open markets. We find that market-structure reforms in the 1990s and 2000s dramatically increased share repurchases because they relaxed constraints on issuers competing with other buyers under price ceilings. The Tick Size Pilot Program, a controlled experiment that partially reversed previous reforms, significantly reduced share repurchases. We estimate that price ceilings and reduced market-structure frictions explain 18% of the secular increase in share repurchases. Meanwhile, these two frictions still exist, which explains why share repurchases have not crowded out dividends entirely.

The Regulation National Market System (Reg NMS) links fragmented stock exchanges by routing orders to the National Best Bid and Offer (NBBO). As the NBBO ignores exchange fees, 62% of routings lead to worse net prices. An increase in fee differences increases the market share captured by orders that refuse Reg NMS routings, particularly for stocks whose fees account for a large portion of transaction costs. Heterogeneous opportunity costs rationalize routing choices: non-routable orders entail lower non-execution costs than routable orders. Our results indicate that fees and clientele segmentation drive the proliferation of order types in the Reg NMS era.

This paper provides the first empirical evidence of the externalities of credit default swaps (CDS). We find that a firm's leverage is lower when a larger proportion of its revenue is derived from CDS-referenced customers. This finding is robust to alternative samples and measures, placebo tests, and the selection of customers by suppliers. Moreover, firms affected by customer CDS trading issue equity to lower leverage, and their equity issuance costs are lower. These findings are consistent with the view that CDS trading on customers improves the information environment for suppliers. Therefore, while many firms are not directly linked to CDS trading, CDS trading on their customers has spillover effects on these firms’ financial policies.

We structurally estimate an investment-based asset pricing model, in which firms' exposure to macroeconomic risk is unknown. Bayesian beliefs about this parameter are updated from firms' and industry peers' comovement between their productivity and consumption growth. The model implies that discount rates rise endogenously with the perceived risk exposure of firms, thereby depressing investment and valuation ratios. We test these predictions in the data and find strong support for them. We also confirm that cross-sectional learning from peers is crucial and that alternative Bayesian risk estimates, which ignore peer observations, do not predict firm variables.

We demonstrate that a financial intermediary-based asset pricing model offers a compelling explanation for a new set of conditional moments of equity term structure and convenience yields. The model’s key mechanism is that the time-varying tightness of intermediaries’ leverage constraints drives significant mean reversion in the price of risk. This model guides us in devising a novel empirical methodology to estimate the tightness of these constraints (i.e., the Relative Tightness Index) from cross-sectional returns of various asset classes. Our findings affirm that this measure significantly drives the dynamics of equity yield slope and convenience yields, both empirically and quantitatively.

Using a structural model, we estimate the liquidity multiplier of an interbank network and banks’ contributions to systemic risk. To provide payment services, banks hold reserves. Their equilibrium holdings can be strategic complements or substitutes. The former arises when payment velocity and multiplier are high. The latter prevails when the opportunity cost of liquidity is large, incentivising banks to borrow neighbors’ reserves instead of holding their own. Consequently, the network can amplify or dampen shocks to individual banks. Empirically, network topology explains cross-sectional heterogeneity in banks’ systemic-risk contributions while changes in the equilibrium type drive time-series variation.