Empirical analysis reveals that investment-banker advisory fees in tender offers average 1.29% of the value of a completed transaction, far below the levels often alluded to in the business press. Most fees are contingent on offer outcome, with target-firm fees typically contingent on transaction value and bidding-firm fees on the number of shares purchased. Although these contingent contracts motivate investment bankers to satisfy some client objectives, many also create conflicts of interest between banker and firm. These incentive problems are apparent in offer evaluation, in hostile offers, and in the price paid by bidding firms.

Latent variable tests of asset pricing models make assumptions about the joint distribution of observable returns and unobservable benchmark returns. These tests can falsely accept models when a mean-variance efficient portfolio other than the benchmark satisfies the distributional assumptions imposed on the benchmark portfolio. Also, because the assumptions are untestable, there is no way to discover whether a model is being rejected because the assumptions are false. Without these assumptions, however, latent variable tests can be viewed only as tests of distributional hypotheses about mean-variance efficient portfolios of unknown composition.

Common stock with limited voting rights changes managerial incentives by allowing managers to separate ownership of equity from ownership of votes. This study compares managerial ownership before and after the creation of a class of limited voting common stock by 44 publicly traded firms between 1962 and 1984, and examines whether the event affects the wealth of current shareholders. There is no evidence that current shareholders are harmed by the creation of limited voting common stock.

This paper re-examines the case of Citizens Utilities, a firm with one class of common stock which pays stock dividends and one which pays taxable cash dividends. John Long's (1978) study of the two shares' relative prices suggests that investors may prefer cash dividends to equal-sized stock dividends. This paper finds that the cash dividend share's ex-day price decline is less than their dividend payment. Stock dividend shares fall by nearly their full dividend. The disparity between ex-day dividend valuation and the observed prices of the two shares is inconsistent with some explanations of the demand for cash dividends.

We develop a theory of warrants held by competitive warrantholders not constrained to exercise their warrants as one block; the theory also applies to convertible bonds held by competitive bondholders not constrained to convert their bonds as one block. We prove that the warrant (bond) price in each of the competitive equilibria is less than or equal to the price in an economy with the block constraint; and for at least one competitive equilibrium the warrant (bond) price equals the warrant (bond) price in the block-constrained economy. We illustrate the paths of competitive warrant exercise and bond conversion and conclude that under realistic assumptions they can be long.

The tax law confers upon the investor a timing option - to realize capital losses and defer capital gains. With the tax rate on long term gains and losses being about half the short term rate, the law provides a second timing option - to realize losses short term and gains long term, if at all. Our theory and simulation over the 1962–1977 period establish that taxable investors should realize long term gains in high variance stocks and repurchase stock in order to realize potential future losses short term. Tax trading does not explain the small-firm anomaly but predicts a seasonal pattern in trading volume which maps into a seasonal pattern in stock prices, the January anomaly, only if investors are irrational or ignorant of the price seasonality.

This paper develops a new methods for measuring tax effects in bond markets and presents empirical results for British Government Securities. The basic idea is to construct a least cost portfolio which, for investors in a given tax bracket, dominates a given bond. A portfolio is said to dominate a bond if it provides cash flows which are at least as great in every period, and has a lower price. In effect our method calculates an upper bound on the value of a bond to investors in a given tax bracket. The results demonstrate (i) the existence of clientele effects and (ii) the absence of an ‘effective tax rate’.

We embed the Sharpe-Lintner, two-parameter asset pricing theory in an intertemporal general equilibrium model. The investment opportunity set changes stochastically over time; in general the short-term and long-term interest rates and the distribution of the rate of return of the market portfolio are non-stationary. This non-stationarity, which is admissible in the Sharpe-Lintner model, has two implications: First, it may bias econometric methods which fail to explicitly take into account the non-stationarity. Second, the sequential application of the Sharpe-Lintner model in the discounting of stochastic cash flows becomes computationally complex and of little practical use.