Knowledge that Transforms

This study uses capital market data to measure the effects of REIT mergers on the wealth of the acquiring trust's shareholders. A significant increase in shareholder wealth is detected. This differs from the findings of other acquisition studies. The primary source of the value gain seems to be improved management of the acquired trust's assets.

A framework is developed in which inferences can be made about the validity of an equilibrium asset pricing relation, even though the central aggregate in this relation is unobservable. A multivariate proxy for the true market portfolio, consisting of an equal-weighted stock index and a long-term government bond index, is employed in an investigation of the Sharpe-Lintner CAPM. The empirical evidence suggests that we can reject the joint hypothesis that (a) CAPM is valid, and (b) multiple correlation between the true market portfolio and proxy assets exceeds 0.7. Connections to the equilibrium factor pricing literature are also explored.

This study analyzes both the causes and effects of mutual S&L conversions to corporate charter. Changes in technology and government policies have substantially increased S&L competition, riskbearing, and potential scale and scope economies. Evidence indicates that these changes have decreased the relative operating advantages of mutual S&Ls, encouraging conversions to stock charter. The S&L's financial and operating characteristics, which affect the success of the conversion effort, are also explored.

This paper develops a Bayesian test of portfolio efficiency and derives a computationally convenient posterior-odds ratio. The analysis indicates that significance levels higher than the traditional 0.05 level are recommended for many test situations. In an example from the literature, the classical test fails to reject with p-value 0.082, yet the odds are nearly two to one against efficiency under apparently reasonable assumptions. Procedures for testing approximate efficiency and for aggregating subperiod results are also considered.

This paper documents the effects of large (block) transactions on the prices of common stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange. We examine whether mean temporary and permanent price effects associated with large and small transactions differ and whether the price effects vary cross-sectionally according to the size of the block. Alternative definitions of block size are investigated – percentage of the equity traded, block volume in relation to normal trading volume, and dollar value of the block. The results suggest that price effects are predominantly temporary for seller-initiated transactions and permanent for buyer-initiated transactions.

The mean return for stocks is positive only for days immediately before and during the first half of calendar months, and indistinguishable from zero for days during the last half of the month. This ‘monthly effect’ is independent of other known calendar anomalies such as the January effect documented by others and appears to be caused by a shift in the mean of the distribution of returns from days in the first half of the month relative to days in the last half.

When testing portfolio efficiency, empiricists usually perform tests using subperiods and aggregate the results in some manner. Although the power of individual subperiod tests has been studied previously, little is known about the power of the aggregate test. Power is evaluated here through simulations using two different aggregation techniques. Aggregate power is substantially higher than that for a single subperiod. For example, in one scenario the aggregate power is 0.77 over a sixty-year period, but only 0.17 for each five-year subperiod. In addition, the level of power depends on the method of aggregation.

The essence of corporate control includes the hiring and firing of key managers. We examine changes in equity values when the Board of Directors appoints and dismisses top-level managers. The evidence suggests that management changes signal shifts in company policy and raise shareholder wealth, internal promotions confirm the soundness of investment by large companies in firm-specific human capital while external appointments do not, promotions occur more often than external appointments but decline in importance as firm size decreases, and dismissal is not a favored means to handle managerial underperformance but is associated with stock price increases when used.

We investigate the valuation consequences of voluntary proposals to sell part or all of a corporation's assets. For partial sell-offs, successful sellers and buyers reap statistically significant abnormal returns of 1.66% and 0.83%, respectively. Unsuccessful sellers realize gains at the bid announcement of 1.41% that are lost at the offer termination. In contrast, proposals to liquidate the firm are associated with significant average abnormal returns of 12.24%. We interpret these findings as evidence that asset sales are associated with the movement of resources to higher-valued uses rather than as evidence of market mispricing before the divestiture announcements.

Common stock with limited voting rights changes managerial incentives by allowing managers to separate ownership of equity from ownership of votes. This study compares managerial ownership before and after the creation of a class of limited voting common stock by 44 publicly traded firms between 1962 and 1984, and examines whether the event affects the wealth of current shareholders. There is no evidence that current shareholders are harmed by the creation of limited voting common stock.