Knowledge that Transforms

We provide evidence that security design reflects the interplay of capital supplier and security issuer preferences. While call provisions have historically been the default option in convertible security design, only a minority of post-2005 issues are callable. Because hedge funds dominate the market for new convertibles today and because convertible arbitrage is less risky without callability, the recent diminution in the frequency of call provisions in new convertible bond issues illustrates the importance of the preferences of the suppliers of capital in security design.

An overlapping generations model with investors having heterogeneous investment horizons leads to a two-factor asset pricing model. The risk premiums are determined by the exposure to the market (myopic betas) and the future return on the efficient portfolio (non-myopic betas), which is identified nonparametrically from equilibrium. Non-myopic betas are priced in the cross-section of stocks, producing increasing and economically significant risk-return relation. In the model with funding constraints, low non-myopic beta stocks deliver higher risk-adjusted returns. Empirically, a betting against non-myopic beta portfolio generates superior performance relative to common factor models and is negatively correlated with the market betting against beta portfolio.

I explore the effect of the threat posed by low-cost competitors on debt structure in the airline industry. I use the route network expansion of low-cost airlines to identify routes where the probability of future entry increases dramatically. I find that when a large portion of their market is threatened, incumbents significantly increase debt maturity before entry occurs. Overall, the main findings suggest that airlines respond to entry threats trading off the benefits of short-term financing for lower rollover risk. The results are consistent with models in which firms set their optimal debt structure in the presence of costly rollover failure.

This paper studies whether director appointments to multiple boards impact firm outcomes. To overcome endogeneity of board appointments, I exploit variation generated by mergers that terminate entire boards and thus shock the appointments of those terminated directors. Reductions of board appointments are associated with higher profitability, market-to-book, and likelihood of directors joining board committees. The performance gains are particularly stark when directors are geographically far from firm headquarters. I conclude that the effect of the shocks to board appointments is: (i) evidence that boards matter; and (ii) plausibly explained by a workload channel: when directors work less elsewhere, their companies benefit.

This paper provides theory and evidence that a low-dimensional term structure model can simultaneously price bonds and related options. It shows that a component of volatility risk largely unrelated to the shape of the yield curve is a determinant of expected excess returns for holding long maturity bonds. It also finds evidence for this return relationship both in the model and directly in the data through regression analysis. The paper also identifies a link between corporate earnings performance and interest rate volatility, providing a channel driving interest rate volatility. The structure of risk in the model that gives rise to these features of volatility is distinct from that inherent in recent models with unspanned stochastic volatility.

We study a controlled experiment in which a bank's loan officers were incentivized based on originated loan volume to encourage prospecting for new business. While treated loan officers did attract new applications, both extensive and intensive margins of loan origination expanded (+ 31% new loans; loan size + 15%). We find that loan officers gave greater weight to hard information in approval decisions. Despite no change in the observable characteristics of approved loans, their default rate increased (+ 24%). Finally, the bank's imputed credit default model lost its predictive power. Overall, loan prospecting incentives led to unfavorable soft information being overlooked in the origination process.

The more the target knows about the bidder, the more difficult is paying the target with overpriced bidder shares. Thus, when bidders are opportunistic, the fraction of stock in the deal payment will be lower for better informed targets. We test this intuitive prediction against the alternative that stock payments primarily reflect bidder concerns with target adverse selection, which implies a greater fraction of stock in the deal payment for better informed targets. Discriminating between these two mutually exclusive and nested predictions requires measures of target information about the bidder but not of market mispricing. We find that public bidders systematically use more stock in the payment when the target knows more about the bidder. Tests exploiting exogenous variation in bidder market-to-book ratios also fail to support bidder opportunism. Finally, greater potential competition from private bidders is associated with greater propensity for public bidders to pay in cash.

The paper shows that lottery-like stocks are hedges against unexpected increases in market volatility. The loading on the aggregate volatility risk factor explains the majority of low abnormal returns to stocks with high maximum returns in the past month (Bali et al., 2011) and high expected skewness (Boyer et al., 2010). Aggregate volatility risk also explains the new evidence that the maximum effect and the skewness effect are stronger for firms with high market to book or high expected probability of bankruptcy.

Understanding the effects of taxes on executive compensation provides insight into the process determining this compensation and is a key input to top income tax rate policy. A 2010 tax reform in Canada, which greatly increased the effective tax rate on stock option compensation for a subset of firms, provides a natural experiment with which to address this issue. Difference-in-differences estimates suggest that this tax increase resulted in an immediate reduction in both stock option grants and the fraction of total compensation made up of stock options with limited, if any, substitution towards other components of compensation.

This paper focuses on funds of funds (FOFs) as a form of financial intermediation in private equity (both buyout and venture capital). After accounting for fees, FOFs provide returns equal to or above public market indices for both buyout and venture capital. While FOFs focusing on buyouts outperform public markets, they underperform direct fund investment strategies in buyout. In contrast, the average performance of FOFs in venture capital is on a par with results from direct venture fund investing. This suggests that FOFs in venture capital (but not in buyouts) are able to identify and access superior performing funds.